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NOTES
Administrative Law-Public Access to Public Records in North
Carolina: The Key to Good Government
Public access to public records provides the key to good government, a
key that unlocks a storehouse of information, a key that upholds our demo-
cratic spirit.1 But exactly how does an individual grasp that key? Consider a
person who wants to know where the state zoo obtains the meat used to feed
the lions. 2 As a program administered by the Secretary of the North Carolina
Department of Natural Resources and Community Development, the zoo
would fall under that agency's rules.3 Presumably, those rules would contain
provisions adopted pursuant to the state public records statute,4 provisions de-
tailing proper procedures for public access. 5 Consequently, persons seeking
information might logically begin with departmental rules governing public
access to public records. In order to examine such rules, the author canvassed
seventeen state agencies. That examination led the author to create a set of
model rules. The results of the agency inquiries and the recommendations of
the model rules provide the subject of this Note.
The North Carolina public records statute has a public access provision
that reads as follows: "Every person having custody of public records shall
permit them to be inspected and examined at reasonable times and under his
supervision by any person, and he shall furnish certified copies thereof on pay-
ment of fees as prescribed by law.' 6 Unfortunately, the North Carolina appel-
late courts rarely have interpreted this statute;7 indeed, the courts did not lay a
1. Surprisingly, the right to inspect does not have a constitutional basis, despite the obvious
congruity of the first amendment. E.g., Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the
Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1957). Instead, the right to
inspect finds its source in English common law. E.g., The King v. Lucas, 103 Eng. Rep. 765 (K.B.
1808). Thus, when visitors to the National Archives Building in Washington, D.C., view the Con-
stitution, they stand on the common law.
2. The example demonstrates that requests to inspect stem from a variety of reasons: the
curiosity of a child, the greed of a knacker, the concern of a horse lover.
3. 15 N.C. Admin. Code 1, 12E (July 31, 1981).
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1981). The statute deals with public records in three main
contexts: destruction, preservation and inspection. The statute does not deal with pretrial discov-
ery of such records.
5. Id. § 132-6. This Note focuses on the right to inspect.
6. Id.
7. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently handed down the state's sole appellate
decision under the public access provision. Advance Publications, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth City,
53 N.C. App. 504, 281 S.E.2d 69 (1981). The opinion first stated that a letter written to the city
manager by a consulting engineer employed to inspect construction of the city's water treatment
plant constituted a "public record" under G.S. 132-1, and then stated that a corporation consti-
tuted a "person" under G.S. 132-6, -9. Id. at 504, 505, 281 S.E.2d at 69-70. Consequently, the
court affirmed an order requiring the city to disclose the record to the publisher. Id. at 507, 281
S.E.2d at 71. Unfortunately, the court compromised this enlightened reasoning by adding that the
existence of a single express exemption in G.S. 132-1.1 indicated a legislative intent to preclude
judicial exemptions. Id. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70 (dictum). Actually, the facts of this case justified
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
common-law foundation for public access prior to the enactment of the stat-
ute. Consequently, many practical questions await clarification. Must the cus-
todian provide space for inspection? What sort of supervision should the
custodian give? Must the custodian permit a person to make his own copies?
What should the custodian do before denying a request for access? What spe-
cific records fall within the definition of public records? The statute does not
expressly address these questions.
Nevertheless, recent critical comment has shown that decisions in other
jurisdictions can uncover the basic principles common to all public records
statutes. 8 An effective right to public access necessarily includes adequate
space9 and personal copies;' 0 however, the need to protect the records from
damage and the agency from disruption limits the exercise of that right to the
custodian's supervision." Furthermore, any denial of the right should state
the specific grounds in order to facilitate review.1 2 Finally, the meaning of
public records deserves a broad construction, 13 limited only by necessary ex-
emptions.' 4 Despite its brevity, the North Carolina statute would permit state
judges to imply similar principles governing the practicalities of public access.
As a result, the rule-making power vested in each state agency can supple-
ment the sparse language of the public access provision by anticipating these
basic principles. For example, rules promulgated under this provision can ar-
ticulate the procedures that follow a grant of inspection-the space provided,
the extent of the custodian's supervision, the methods of making copies, and so
forth. Similarly, such rules can articulate the procedures that follow a denial
of inspection-a statement of the reasons for denial. Furthermore, the rules
can provide guidance concerning what records qualify as public records. Un-
til North Carolina courts speak to these matters, agency rules defining public
access to public records must supply the necessary direction.' 5
The clear importance of rule-making to the right of access recommended
a review of each agency's rules promulgated under the public access provision,
as well as some measure of the general availability of such rules. Conse-
quently, the author sent the following simple request to sixteen state agen-
the court's refusal to create an exemption, obviating the need to consider the validity of court-
created exemptions. Id. at 507, 281 S.E.2d at 71.
8. Comment, Administrative Law-Public Access to Government-Held Records: A Ne-
glected Right in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1187 (1977). This excellent comment attempted
to facilitate access by drafting a proposed state statute to replace the current North Carolina pub-
lic records statute. Although the proposal failed to move the legislature, the research behind that
proposal merits further attention. Consequently, this short Note suggests rules reform rather than
statutory reform as a means to improving public access.
9. Id. at 1202.
10. Id. at 1204-05.
11. Id. at 1201-04.
12. Id. at 1219.
13. Id. at 1189-93.
14. Id. at 1193-99.
15. Any person denied access may seek a remedy in the courts. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9
(1981). Nevertheless, the cost and the delay of litigation probably discourage enforcement of the
statute. Consequently, the state's appellate courts have few opportunities to interpret the statute.
Comment, supra note 8, at 1223.
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cies: 16 "Please send me a copy of your agency's rules concerning public access
to public records."' 17 The request neither disclosed a purpose nor mentioned
the statute because such requests should not depend upon prior justification or
upon specific citation.' 8 The author also contacted another agency while em-
ployed there as a summer intern.' 9 These seventeen agencies, with heads ei-
ther elected by the voters or appointed by the Governor, included all but one
of the major administrative bodies in the state.20
The Department of Administration did not make a written response to
the request for rules. The Department of Correction answered by suggesting
resubmission of the request to the Attorney General, to the Law Librarian at
the University of North Carolina School of Law, or to a named law student at
that school "familiar with the manner whereby individuals. . . properly ad-
dress requests ... to state agencies." 2 1 Several agencies, including the De-
partments of Agriculture, Commerce, Crime Control and Public Safety,
Cultural Resources, Human Resources, Insurance, Justice, Labor, State Audi-
tor, and Treasurer, plus the State Board of Elections, indicated that they had
not written any rules under the state's public records statute.22 And the Attor-
ney General, responding for the Departments of Revenue and Transportation,
added these departments to the list of agencies without rules.23 Thus, one
state agency made no answer, another agency answered that the request
should have gone elsewhere, and thirteen agencies answered that they had no
rules.
Three of these thirteen agencies justified their lack of rules by arguing
that they had no authority to write rules under the public records statute. The
Department of Justice applied this view to itself as well as to the Department
of Transportation,24 stating that the public records statute "does not vest any
agency with regulatory authority over the issue of public access to public
16. The agencies included the State Board of Elections and the North Carolina Departments
of Administration, Agriculture, Commerce, Correction, Crime Control and Public Safety, Cul-
tural Resources, Human Resources, Insurance, Justice, Labor, Revenue, Secretary of State, State
Auditor, Transportation and Treasurer.
17. The request appeared under a North Carolina Law Review letterhead.
18. Presumably, a person asking how to make requests for public records would not realize
that he should explain his curiosity and would not know of the existence of the public records
statute. For an experimental design testing the availability of public records, see Divorski,
Gordon & Heinz, Public Access to Government Information: A Field Experiment, 68 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 240 (1973).
19. The North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Development.
20. The North Carolina Department of Public Education inadvertently was omitted from the
survey.
21. Letter from Department of Correction (Aug. 19, 1981) (on file at N.C.L. Rev. office).
22. Letters from Departments of Agriculture (July 2, 1981) (implicit indication), Commerce
(July 13, 1981), Crime Control and Public Safety (July 27, 1981), Cultural Resources (June 30,
1981), Human Resources (undated), Insurance (July 1, 1981) (implicit indication), Justice (July 10,
1981), Labor (Aug. 18, 1981) (implicit indication), State Auditor (July 8, 1981) and Treasurer
(June 29, 1981), and from the State Board of Elections (July 7, 1981) (all letters on fie at N.C.L.
Rev. office).
23. Letters from Department of Justice for the Department of Revenue (July 3, 1981) and for
the Department of Transportation (July 2, 1981) (both letters on fie at N.C.L. Rev. office).
24. Letter from Department of Justice for the Department of Transportation, supra note 23
(the public access provision "does not provide for regulations").
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records." 25 The Department of Commerce also adopted this reasoning.26
Only two of the seventeen agencies contacted indicated that they had
rules. The Department of the Secretary of State sent copies in response to the
request, 27 and the Department of Natural Resources and Community Devel-
opment supplied copies directly to the author during his employment with
them.28 A third agency, the Department of Human Resources, indicated that
it had not written a rule under the public records statute, when such a rule did
in fact exist.29
As previously described, fifteen of the seventeen agencies failed to make a
satisfactory response or failed to write rules under the public access provision.
This fact should cause surprise because public access lies at the very heart of
democratic government. The idea of an informed populace, 30 and the corol-
lary notion of governmental accountability, 31 demand readily available proce-
dural rules describing the precise manner in which individuals may address
their state agencies. Without such rules, governmental responses to requests
for information may result in arbitrary limits on the right of inspection.32
Rather than hinder public access, democratic government should help it.
Three agencies, including the Department of Justice, failed to write rules
governing public access because they doubted their authority.33 Although the
public records statute itself does not mention such authorization, the legisla-
ture expressly delegated regulatory power under two other statutes. The Exec-
utive Organization Act of 1973 permits state agencies to adopt regulations
governing "[tihe . . performance of business. . .[and the] use. . . of the
records... pertaining to department business."'34 More importantly, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act requires each agency to "[aldopt rules of practice
setting forth. . . all formal and informal procedures available. . .[and to]
[m]ake available for public inspection all rules . . . used by the agency."'35
Presumably, a request for public records would constitute "business," and the
custodian's response would constitute "practice."'36
25. Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 22.
26. Letter from Department of Commerce, supra note 22 ("the department has no. . .au-
thority to adopt rules concerning public access").
27. Letter from Department of Secretary of State (undated) (citing 18 N.C. Admin. Code 1
.0601 (July 31, 1981)) (on file at N.C.L. Rev. office).
28. See 15 N.C. Admin. Code IB .0600 (July 31, 1981).
29. Compare Letter from Department of Human Resources, supra note 22, with 10 N.C.
Admin. Code ID .0101 (July 31, 1981).
30. "[W]henever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own govern-
ment. ... Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Richard Price (Jan. 8, 1789), reprinted in 7 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 253 (A. Bergh ed. 1905) [hereinafter cited as Writings].
31. "[W]hile in public service... I thought the public entitled to frankness, and intimately
to know whom they employed." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12,
1816), reprinted in 15 Writings, supra note 30, at 32.
32. Comment, supra note 8, at 1201, 1220.
33. Letters from Departments of Commerce and Justice, both supra note 22, and Transporta-
tion, supra note 23.
34. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-10(j) (1978).
35. Id. § 150A-1 1.
36. An implied authority to adopt necessary rules, based on the custodian's express authority
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Although three agencies have written rules, those rules present problems.
The Department of Human Resources 37 does not define public records and
does not describe public access except to say that "[a] person may contact indi-
vidual employees." s38 The Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development3 9 not only cites the wrong provision of the statute40 but also
violates the intent of the applicable statutory provision by narrowing the deft-
to supervise inspection, id. § 132-6, may also exist. See, e.g., In re Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc. 2d
471,472, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("[T]he officer having. . . custody of. . .records
... [must] give to citizens and taxpayers the privilege of inspection. ... ). This argument de-
serves special consideration because the Administrative Procedure Act specifically exempts the
Departments of Correction, Revenue and Transportation from the "rules of practice" provision.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 150A-1, -11 (1978).
37. The rule written by the Department of Human Resources reads as follows:
.0101 OBTAINING INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT
(a) A person may contact individual employees within a program or service in
which the employee is personally involved and about which the employee is informed.
(b) A person seeking information concerning events or activities of major or ur-
gent importance should contact the public information office.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 132-1, -6;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
10 N.C. Admin. Code 1D .0101 (July 31, 1981).
38. Id.
39. The rules written by the Department of Natural Resources and Community Develop-
ment read as follows:
.0601 PUBLIC RECORDS
Except as hereinafter provided any nonprivileged document made or received pur-
suant to law or regulation in the possession of the department is a public record for the
purposes of this section.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
.0602 INTERNAL MEMORANDA
Internal memoranda between and among employees and offices of the department
are not public records for the purposes of this section.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
.0603 ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
(a) All public records may be inspected by citizens of North Carolina for all rea-
sonable purposes after making a proper request and receiving permission from the de-
partment.
(b) Access will be provided at the situs of the agency which has possession of the
public record.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
.0604 REQUEST FOR ACCESS
(a) Request for access to a public record shall be made to Secretary of the depart-
ment.
(b) Request must be in writing and describe with reasonable specificity the docu-
ment or documents desired to be received.
(c) The request must also give the reason the applicant desires to view the record.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
.0605 VIEWING THE DOCUMENT
The applicant who has been given permission to inspect a document may inspect the
document during business hours of the agency at the situs of the agency which has pos-
session of the document.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
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nition of public record,41 by limiting inspection to state citizens,42 and by de-
manding to know the reason for the request.43 The Department of the
Secretary of State" anticipates broad disclosure but provides little practical
guidance. Thus, only three agencies out of seventeen have rules, 45 and those
rules really do not help individuals seeking information from their
government.
The problems encountered with the rules actually adopted, and the scar-
city of such rules, recommend immediate action. That action must take differ-
ent forms, because the unique characteristics of a given office dictate different
rules requirements. Consequently, the following model rules drafted by the
author serve as catalyst rather than as copy.4 6
MODEL RULES OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
.0001 DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply to rules contained in this Section:
.0606 RETENTION OF CUSTODY
No public document may be taken from the agency situs. Copies may be made at
ten cents ($.10) per copy per sheet.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10; 132-9;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
15 N.C. Admin. Code lB .0601 to .0606 (July 31, 1981).
40. The provision cited deals with the remedy for the denial of public access to public
records. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9 (1981). The Department should have cited the public access
provision. See id. § 132-6.
41. The rules omit the statutory phrase "in connection with the transaction of public busi-
ness" but retain the statutory phrase "pursuant to law." Compare 15 N.C. Admin. Code lB .0601
(July 31, 1981) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1 (1981). The omission makes a difference because the
former phrase apprehends a broad definition of public records while the latter phrase apprehends
a narrow definition. Comment, supra note 8, at 1190-91. Also note that the rules exempt internal
memoranda. 15 N.C. Ad. Code lB .0602 (July 31, 1981).
42. Although the rules read "citizens," the statute reads "any person." Compare 15 N.C.
Admin. Code 1B .0603 (July 31, 1981) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1981).
43. The rules state that the request must "give the reason the applicant desires to view the
record"; however, the statute does not anticipate this requirement. Compare 15 N.C. Admin.
Code lB .0604 (July 31, 1981) with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1981). Whether motivated by curios-
ity, private gain or public responsibility, a person intending the lawful use of public records
should gain access. Comment, supra note 8, at 1208 & nn.146-47.
44. The rule written by the Department of the Secretary of State reads as follows:
.0601 INSPECTION
Except where made confidential by law, all records filed with the Department of the
Secretary of State are public records and are available for inspection during the hours of
business specified in the rules of the particular division having custody of the records.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 132-6;
Eff. February 1, 1976.
18 N.C. Admin. Code 1 .0601 (July 31, 1981).
45. The Department of Administration, the agency that failed to make a written response,
does not have any public access rules. Though not included in the survey, an eighteenth agency,
the Department of Public Education, also failed to write rules under the public access provision of
the public records statute.
46. The model rules reflect the general requirements of the departments as opposed to the
more specific requirements of the various divisions constituting those departments. For example,
a division that receives many records requests may want to designate a particular area for inspec-
tions, while a division that receives few records requests may want only to provide an unoccupied
desk for inspections. Whatever the division's specific requirements, the department should write
rules that draw attention to the general need for divisional rules governing adequate space. See
Comment, supra note 8, at 1202.
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(1) "Public Records"
(a) "Public Records" means all documentary material, regard-
less of physical form, which the agency makes or receives
pursuant to law, or which the agency uses in connection
with the transaction of public business.
(b) "Public Records" include documents, papers, letters,
maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, mag-
netic or other tapes, electronic data-processing records,
and artifacts.
(c) "Public Records" do not include:
(i) Records specifically exempted from disclosure by a
federal or state statute.
(ii) Records protected by a privilege.
(iii) Records that the agency reasonably believes confi-
dential because disclosure would invade personal
privacy, reveal the identity of an informant, or harm
governmental interests.
(2) "Agency" means the Department of ,or any of its di-
visions or offices.
(3) "Custodian" means the public official in charge of an office hav-
ing public records, or any person given personal control of such
records by the public official.




(a) Access to public records promotes frequent accountability by
the government and informed participation by the people; con-
sequently, the custodian shall prominently post this Section in
his office.
(b) Any person may seek the custodian's permission to inspect the
agency's public records by describing the records in terms suffi-
cient to secure their retrieval.
(c) The custodian shall provide adequate space during office hours
to all persons making a reasonable request for public records,
and the custodian shall supervise the inspection in order to pro-
tect the public records and to prevent the disruption of the
office.
(d) All persons making a request for public records may copy such
records, or may ask the custodian to provide copies at ten cents
($.10) per page.
(e) Before denying a request for public records, the custodian shall
seek an advisory opinion from the Attorney General's staff con-
cerning such denial. However, the custodian shall not extend
the deadline for his decision while awaiting the opinion. If the
custodian denies access to any public record, the custodian shall
give the person making the request a written statement of the
reasons for the denial.
1982]
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(f) The agency shall create a public records committee to review
denials. The committee shall render its decision after consider-
ing the written statement prepared by the custodian and the ad-
visory opinion submitted by the Attorney General's staff.
(g) The custodian's failure to deny or to grant the request within
ten working days shall constitute a denial, and the committee's
failure to render a decision within five working days shall con-
stitute a final agency action.
History Note: Statutory Authority G.S. 143B-10(j); 150A-1 1; 132-6;
132-9;
Eff.
The model rules respect the public's right to know. The definitions sup-
plied track the broad definitions contained in the statute.47 In particular,
"public records" sweeps up every imaginable item, provided that a special
statute does not control the record, that a privilege does not protect the record,
and that certain policy considerations do not affect the record. Special statutes
include those governing state employees' personnel files and legislative lobby-
ists' expense accounts. 48 Privilege extends beyond the public records statute's
treatment to traditional notions of confidential communication.49 Policy con-
siderations include: personal privacy-for example, manufacturers who coop-
erate with pollution investigations by supplying inadmissible evidence;50
informant identity-for example, individuals who report unlawful waste dis-
charges into the state's river system;51 and governmental interests-for exam-
ple, the need to withhold the precise location of an endangered species' natural
habitat. 52 Unless the public record fits one of these exemptions, the govern-
47. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 132-1, -1.1, -2 (1981).
48. Id. § § 126-22 to -29 (state employees' personnel files not open to inspection); id. § 120-
47.6 (legislative lobbyists' expense accounts open to inspection). For a more complete list, see
Comment, supra note 8, at 1193 & n.44.
49. The statute mentions only communications made by counsel to the agency, suggesting
that the legislature assumed that communications made by the agency to counsel, the essence of
the attorney-client privilege, did not need express protection. After all, courts in other states have
recognized that agencies may withhold privileged records. This argument preserves both the at-
torney-client privilege and the doctor-patient privilege. Id. at 1196-97. But see Advance Publica-
tions, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth City, 53 N.C. App. 504, 506, 281 S.E.2d 69, 70 (1981) (the state
legislature intended only the one exception provided in the statute) (dictum).
50. The proliferation of government information on individual citizens has caused many
courts to protect personal privacy. Comment, supra note 8, at 1196. Although North Carolina
courts have not considered privacy under the public records statute, they have recognized privacy
in other contexts. E.g., In re Investigation by Att'y Gen., 30 N.C. App. 585, 227 S.E.2d 645 (1976)
(telephone company that cooperated with criminal investigation by supplying inadmissible evi-
dence entitled to order prohibiting public disclosure), cited in Comment supra note 8, at 1196
n.60. "Reverse freedom of information" suits in federal courts also indicate the growing impor-
tance of legitimate privacy interests. See, e.g., Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-
The Reverse FOIA Suit, 1976 Duke L.J. 330, cited in Comment, supra note 8, at 1215 n.174. But
see Advance Publications, 53 N.C. App. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70 (dictum).
51. Though more common in criminal law enforcement, the protection of government
sources often serves the public interest in other administrative areas. Comment, supra note 8, at
1195-96. But see Advance Publications, 53 N.C. App. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70 (dictum).
52. Many courts permit agencies to withhold records when disclosure would harm the gov-
ernmen's financial or other interests. Comment, supra note 8, at 1196, 1213. But see Advance
Publications, 53 N.C. App. at 506, 281 S.E.2d at 70 (dictum).
[Vol. 60
PUBLIC ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
ment may not keep the record secret.53
Procedures under the model rules also favor broad disclosure. A person
may submit a request orally or in writing.54 The person making the request
need not demonstrate any interest in the record,55 and the request itself need
only meet a minimum standard of specificity;56 however, the person must
make a reasonable request-one that does not require an exceptionally large
number of records to discover a relatively insignificant fact. 57 The custodian
must make the records available during office hours58 and must provide ade-
quate space;59 furthermore, the custodian's supervision must extend only to
protection of the records from damage and protection of the office from dis-
ruption.60 In addition to a request for a certified copy under the statute, a
person may make his ovhn copies or may pay the custodian for office copies.
61
To discourage a casual denial of a request to inspect, the rules require the
custodian to seek an advisory opinion from the Attorney General's office
62
53. Defining public records to exempt those records not open to inspection differs from creat-
ing specific exemptions to a general definition of public records. See Comment, supra note 8, at
1193. The statute prefers the latter method, defining public records in one provision and creating
a single exemption for counsel-to-agency communications in another provision. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 132-1, -1.1 (1981). However, the Attorney General's opinions prefer the former method, defin-
ing any records not subject to inspection as "not public records." E.g., Public Records Opinion, 44
N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. 340 (1975) ("police. . .[criminal] investigative reports. . . are not public
records"). The model rules adopt the Attorney General's approach because agencies seeking the
opinion generally phrase their questions in terms of public records/not public records. Id. Never-
theless, the statute's approach creates less confusion because a public record exempted from in-
spection still qualifies as a public record subject to preservation and discovery. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 132-8 to -8.2 (1981); 44 N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. at 341; Comment, supra note 8, at 1192-93. See
also Advance Publications, 53 N.C. App. at 504, 281 S.E.2d at 69 (issue defined as whether letter
constituted "a public record subject to disclosure").
54. The agency does not have any reason to discriminate between telephone requests and
mail requests. Comment, supra note 8, at 1218.
55. The statute says that "any person" may request inspection. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6
(1981). Other states have interpreted such language as eliminating the common-law interest re-
quirement. Comment, supra note 8, at 1199-1200.
56. The identification requirement should serve to locate the record rather than to restrict
public access. E.g., In re Dunlea v. Goldmark, 85 Misc. 2d 198, 201,380 N.Y.S.2d 496, 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1976) (both the party making the request and the agency entertaining the request share respon-
sibility under the state statute's identity requirement). Of course, the custodian should not have to
perform general research beyond retrieving the record. Comment, supra note 8, at 1206, 1219.
57. An overly broad request would burden unnecessarily the custodian's supervision and
other persons' inspections. Comment, supra note 8, at 1204.
58. Id. at 1200, 1203.
59. Id. at 1200, 1202.
60. If inspection threatens the original record with damage, then the custodian must substi-
tute copies for the original. Id. at 1201-02. If inspection threatens the office with disruption, then
the custodian must limit access; for example, the custodian may restrict access to a few hours per
day when employees need the records in their work. Id. at 1203-04.
61. Although the public access provision of the public records statute does not say whether a
person may make his own copies, the remedies provision refers to access for "inspection, examina-
tion or copying." Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (1981) with id. § 132-9. See also Advance
Publications, 53 N.C. App. at 505, 281 S.E.2d at 70 ("plaintiff. . . entitled to ...copying
rights"). Such right would exist in the absence of this statutory language. Comment, supra note 8,
at 1204-05.
When the custodian makes copies, the state may charge a fee designed to recover the costs of
reproduction excluding labor. Id. at 1206-07.
62. The Texas public records statute contains such a provision. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1982), cited in Comment, supra note 8, at 1223 & n.195.
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and to prepare a written statement of his reasons.63 These two requirements
also facilitate agency review of denials.64 The fifteen-day limit on that agency
review prevents delays that could postpone judicial resolution.65 Finally, the
custodian must post these rules in his office and should provide copies of these
rules free to persons making requests for public records, because rules that
unlock governmental information deserve wide publication. 66
Rules promulgated under the state's public records statute contain the key
to good government. Our state agencies, however, have failed to adopt effec-
tive rules, depriving the public of a practical framework for the right to access.
In turn, the resulting lack of disclosure discredits government by consent.
Public distrust grows.67 Perhaps a model set of such rules will encourage each
agency to review its posture.
WILLIAM MCBLIEF
63. The statement should indicate the statute, the privilege or the policy that causes the rec-
ord to fall outside the definition of "public records." Comment, supra note 8, at 1219.
64. This review proceeding does not anticipate an adjudicatory hearing; consequently, the
Administrative Procedure Act's provisions on contested cases do not apply. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 150A-2, -23 to -37 (1978).
65. Persons denied inspection may apply to the courts for "an order compelling disclosure."
Id. § 132-9 (1981).
66. The publication requirement avoids arbitrary limits on public access. Comment, supra
note 8, at 1218, 1219-20.
67. The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 20, 1981, at 4, col. 1.
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Administrative Law-American Textile Manufacturers Institute,
Inc. v. Donovan: Judicial Review Under OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of. 1970' set the ambitious goal
of assuring "so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions."'2 In both its language and its tone, the
Act emphasized worker health and safety, which were to be promoted through
the promulgation of national standards. The Secretary of Labor was directed
in compelling but unfortunately imprecise terms to set standards that "to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence," would prevent
material impairment of employee health.3 In American Textile Manufacturers
Institute, Inc. v. Donovan4 the United States Supreme Court considered basic
definitional parameters for the type of evidence that would be deemed suffi-
cient to withstand the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review man-
dated by the Act.5 In American Textile representatives of the cotton industry,
insisting that both highly exacting evidence6 and cost-benefit analysis7 were
required under the Act, brought suit challenging the validity of the cotton dust
standards set by the Secretary.8 Giving a deferential reading to "substantial
evidence," the Court ruled that feasibility analysis was sufficient for the enact-
ment of standards9 to combat cotton dust exposure and the resulting brown
lung disease, regardless of the cost to the industry. 10 The Court thereby recog-
nized the Secretary's broad power to regulate, even in cases in which data
imperfection inevitably yielded evidence of debatable substance. The concern
for the textile worker's health preempted the rigorous substantial evidence re-
quirement and cost-benefit analysis urged by the industry.
The cotton dust exposure standards under attack in American Textile
were those issued by the Secretary of Labor in June 1978."1 Temporary stan-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2. Id. § 651(b).
3. Id. § 655(b)(5). The text of the section provides as follows:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately as-
sures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.. . . In addition to the
attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other
considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever
practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria
and of the performance desired.
4. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976) provides that "[tihe determinations of the Secretary shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole."
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2497.
7. Id. at 2483.
8. Id. The standards are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981).
9. Id. at 2492.
10. Id. at 2504.
11. Codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1981). See generally 101 S. Ct. at 2485-87 (providing
a more in-depth treatment of the history of cotton dust standards in the United States).
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dards had been promulgated in 1970,12 but debate over allowable exposure
standards continued through the next decade. In 1978, acting through the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Secretary promul-
gated permanent standards that reflected a predominant concern for worker
health. 13 However, it had become apparent long before 1978 that worker
health in the textile industry was a matter of great national concern. By the
1960s, exposure to cotton dust had been shown unequivocally to bear a direct
relation to the incidence of brown lung disease, or byssinosis, a serious respira-
tory disease that affects more than 100,000 workers in the textile industry.' 4
Incidence rates range from twenty to thirty percent among workers exposed to
the dust, and "each worker faces a substantial risk of health impairment."' 5
The variable 200/500/750 micrograms per cubic meter (Rig/m 3) standard
that ultimately was adopted was predicated on the results of two separate ex-
posure studies. 16 Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an OSHA-contracted
group, conducted the first study. The second study was the result of an in-
dependent investigation conducted by industry representatives (Hocutt-
Thomas). 17 Both studies focused in part on the total cost of engineering con-
12. See 101 S. Ct. at 2485 (pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976)).
13. In 1966 the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) had
recommended that cotton dust exposure be limited to 1000 micrograms per cubic meter of air
(1000 jig/m 3) per eight-hour workday. Id. at 2485. The temporary regulation promulgated in
1970 included the 1000 pjg/m 3 limit for total dust exposure. See note 12 supra. In 1974 ACGIH
lowered its recommended daily exposure levels to 200 pjg/m 3, at which time the Director of the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (created by the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976))
requested that the Secretary adopt the more stringent standard. 101 S. Ct. at 2485. By that time,
the Textile Workers Union of American had joined with the North Carolina Public Interest Re-
search Group to petition the Secretary to set an exposure limit of 100 tjg/m 3. Id. After three
hearings, much testimony, and numerous post-hearing comments and briefs, the following final
cotton dust standards were adopted:
Mandatory Permissible Exposure Limit
Over Eight-Hour Period
Yarn manufacturing ................................................. 2001ig/m 3
Slashing and weaving operations ...................................... 750jig/m 3
All other operations ................................................. 5001gg/m 3
101 S. Ct. at 2486-87.
14. See S. Rep. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 5177, 5179 (noting that recognition of brown lung disease as a distinct occupational hazard
was relatively recent in the United States despite repeated warnings from other textile-producing
nations). For an overview of brown lung disease in the textile industry, see Brown Lung: Hearing
Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978); Schrag &
Gullett, Byssinosis in Cotton Textile Mills, 101 Am. Rev. Resp. Disease 497 (1970).
15. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afld in part, vacated in part
sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). SinceAmerican
Textile was decided in June 1981, the American Textile Manufacturers Institute has conducted its
own study, which reports that fewer than one-half of one percent of textile workers suffer from
byssinosis. Telephone interview with Elisa Braver, Epidemiologist, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1,
1982). However, Braver cited a number of critical inadequacies with the Institute's methodology:the study lacked a control group, failed to use the conventional Schilling classification to diagnose
health impairment and gave only marginal attention to exposure data. Thus, there is serious doubtas to the reliability of the Institute's conclusion tha  only 670 of the 400,000 workers surveyed
suffered from byssinosis. Id.16. 101 5. Ct. at 2497. See also note 13 supra.
17. Id. at 2497. See RTI, Cotton Dust: Technological Feasibility Assessment and Final In-
flationary Impact Statement (1976); see also Statements of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice-President,
Engineering, Pneumafil Corp., Ex. 60, 2228-47 and Arthur Thomas, Senior Vice-President, The
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trols for the achievement of more stringent exposure levels than the temporary
1000 pjg/m 3 limit.18 The common focus did not lead to a common result,
however. RTI estimated that compliance with proposed standards would cost
the textile industry $1.1 billion, while Hocutt-Thomas indicated that similarly
protective exposure levels could be achieved through engineering controls
costing only $543 million. 19
In the course of setting its standards, OSHA questioned the validity of
both studies. RTI mistakenly had included in its computations both synthetic
mills, whose operations do not generate cotton dust, and mills already in com-
pliance. In addition, the RTI study lacked current data.20 Hocutt-Thomas
also was thought improperly to have included synthetic mills in its compliance
calculations. Moreover, Hocutt-Thomas failed to take into account natural
production trends to replace old machinery and technological advances likely
to occur during the four-year compliance period.2 1 In spite of these acknowl-
edged data inadequacies, OSHA finally adopted the Hocutt-Thomas study as
"more realistic" than that of RTI.22
Claiming that $543 million was a gross underestimate for compliance
given the stringent standards finally adopted,23 the industry brought suit chal-
lenging the standard in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.24 The court of appeals held that there was substantial evidence to
support the standard and that feasibility analysis was contemplated by the
Act. 25 Twelve individual cotton textile manufacturers and the American Tex-
tile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., which represents more than 175 companies,
then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review. Petitioners chal-
lenged the substantiality of the evidence supporting OSHA's determination
that the cotton dust standard was economically feasible26 and alleged that the
Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, 2248-57, reprinted in joint appendix to AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636
(D.C. Cir. 1979). Because the Hocutt-Thomas study was the more recent of the two, it was perhaps
more attractive to OSHA in its search for valid data.
18. See note 13 supra.
19. 101 S. Ct. at 2498. RTI had made cost estimates for permissible exposure limits (PELs)
of 100, 200 and 500 t~g/m 3, but OSHA found them too unreliable to adopt as final estimates. Id.
at 2500 n.53. Hocutt insisted that a PEL of 200 iig/m 3 was technologically impracticable for
certain production operations; therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates for the 200 Pjg/m 3
level. Id.
20. Id. at 2498.
21. Id. at 2499.
22. Id. at 2498.
23. The guidelines ultimately promulgated not only set the variable exposure level of
200/500/750 jig/m 3, but also called for exposure monitoring, medical surveillance of employees,
educational programs, provision of respirators in certain situations and transfer without loss of
pay for any employee unable to wear a required respirator. Id. at 2487.
24. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979), afid in part, vacated in part sub
nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
25. Id. at 664-66. See note 3 supra & note 31 infra. The court expressed humanitarian con-
cerns in rejecting cost-benefit analysis under 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976): "Especially where a
pliy aims to protect the health and lives of thousands of people, the difference in comparing
widely dispersed benefits with more concentrated and calculable costs may overwhelm the advan-
tages of such analysis." 617 F.2d at 655. These same concerns also offer a partial explanation for
the court's very flexible application of the "substantial evidence" standard of review.
26. 101 S. Ct. at 2483 & n.5, 2497.
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Act required the Secretary to engage in a cost-benefit analysis before promul-
gating any exposure standard.27 Additionally, petitioners questioned the au-
thority of OSHA to mandate a transfer with full pay for industry employees
unable to wear required respirators.28 The industry received a single, cold
concession in the Court's ruling-the issue of transfer with pay was remanded
for determination whether the provision bore a reasonable relationship to the
protection of worker health.29 The ruling of the court of appeals was upheld
in all other respects.30 Not only was an elaborate cost-benefit analysis rejected
in favor of a simple feasibility analysis, 3 1 but also the admittedly imprecise
Hocutt-Thomas study was found to present evidence of sufficient substantial-
ity to warrant upholding the standards adopted by the Secretary.32
Although the decision was a difficult one for the industry to accept, it was
well in keeping with the legislative history of the Act. The legislative intent
behind the Act admittedly was "not crystal clear,"'33 but congressional debate
was unmistakably "replete with concern about dangers" to worker health and
safety.34 In American Textile rejection of the substantial evidence challenge
27. Id. at 2483.
28. Id. at 2483 & n.5, 2504.
29. Id. at 2505-06.
30. Id. at 2506.
31. Id. at 2491-97. Cost-benefit analysis would consist of balancing costs to the industry
against the resulting reduction in risk to the working population. Such an analysis certainly
would require some calculation of the value of human life. By contrast, feasibility analysis re-
quires that a regulatory agency address these three questions: (1) does the worksite present unsafe
conditions of employment or significant risks to worker health?; (2) is the standard promulgated
the most protective possible?; and (3) is achievement of the standard feasible? See generally Note,
Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Health Act of 1970: Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Required?, 49
Fordham L. Rev. 432 (1980).
32. 101 S. Ct. at 2500. The evidence ultimately was found to support a total cost estimate for
compliance which included engineering controls at $543 million (Hocutt-Thomas study), medical
surveillance and monitoring at $7 million, and waste and seed processing at $106.5 million, for a
total of $656.5 million. Id. at 2498 n.44.
In deciding whether OSHA's determination had been based on "substantial evidence," the
Court followed the standard of review articulated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951). See 101 S. Ct. at 2497. In that case, the Court stated that "substantial evidence" is
"more than a mere scintilla. . . . [It is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." 340 U.S. at 477. While the reviewing court must take con-
tradictory evidence into account, the "possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence." Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Ordinarily, an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard of judicial review is used in cases involving informal rulemaking proce-
dures. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). However, the Administrative
Procedure Act applies only when the statute in question does not provide specifically for a stan-
dard of review. Id. § 703. In the case of OSHA, the "substantial evidence" standard is mandated
by 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). Thus, by combining the informal procedure of notice-and-comment
rulemaking with the essentially formal standard of "substantial evidence" review, OSHA has a
"hybrid nature." Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,473 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Review
is therefore complicated for the court, since detailed records often are lacking because of the
informal procedures. For an insightful treatment of "substantial evidence" review in this area, see
Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1233(1951); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 Va. L. Rev. 185 (1974); Note, Scru-
tiny of OSHA Regulation in the Courts: A Study of Judicial Activism, 14 U. Rich. L. Rev. 623
(1980).
33. 101 S. Ct. at 2493.
34. Note, supra note 31, at 445 (indicating that employee safety is paramount concern of the
Act, as reflected in legislative history). As introduced by Representative Daniels in the House,
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and the cost-benefit analysis represented a recognition by the Court that math-
ematical exactitude cannot be demanded when considering worker health in
the light of state-of-the-art technology and present medical knowledge.
The Court had been offered an earlier opportunity in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute35 to clarify the issues of substan-
tial evidence review and cost-benefit analysis in a case involving the benzene
exposure standard. The issue of substantial evidence emerged as the touch-
stone of the Court's holding in American Petroleum. The cost-benefit issue
never was reached, since the stringent benzene standards were held unenforce-
able because they were unsupported by evidence of sufficient scientific sub-
stantiality.36 The threshold proof that a low exposure level was "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" to effect a drop in the incidence of leukemia simply
had not been produced. 37 On the basis of more than fifty volumes of exhibits
and testimony, OSHA had found that a reduction in exposure from ten parts
to one part per million of benzene was "likely" to yield "appreciable" bene-
fits.3 8 The Court, emphasizing that administrative procedure placed the bur-
den upon the agency to justify any new standard promulgated, did not think
that the evidence met the substantiality requirement. 39 The Court did recog-
nize that "OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant risk
exists with anything approaching scientific certainty." 4 In particular, the
Court thought that section 655(b)(5), which specifically allows the Secretary to
promulgate regulations on the basis of the "best available evidence, ' '41 "gave
OSHA some leeway where its findings must be made on the frontiers of scien-
tific knowledge." 42 Nevertheless, the plurality remained unconvinced by the
fifty volumes of benzene data and refused to approve the more protective
standard.
The dissent in American Petroleum espoused a more liberal notion of
"leeway" and expressed the strongly worded view that the Secretary clearly
had produced "substantial evidence that exposure to benzene caused leuke-
mia."' 4 3 While the dissenters plainly recognized that it was their duty to un-
OSHA originally required a standard that "most adequately assures... that no employee will
suffer any impairment of health." H.R. Rep. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970). Emphasizing
that the House bill reflected an unfairly "single-minded punitive approach" towards employers,
Senator Dominick led a drive that culminated in several restrictive amendments. Sen. Rep. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970). As finally codified, the Act was limited to concerns of "mate-
rial health impairment" caused by "toxic materials or harmful physical agents." 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1976). The scope of the Act was narrowed, but its preeminent concern was still
worker health. See 101 S. Ct. at 2493-97.
35. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 653.
37. Id. at 638.
38. Id. at 653.
39. Id. at 652-53.
40. Id. at 656.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
42. 448 U.S. at 656.
43. Id. at 698. Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun dissented in the judgment
and roundly condemned the plurality's decision as "both extraordinarily arrogant and extraordi-
narily unfair." Id. at 695.
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dertake a "searching and careful judicial inquiry" into the basis of the
Secretary's findings,44 they also recognized that this duty did not mean that
they were to "undertake independent review of adequately supported scientific
findings made by a technically expert agency."45 Emphasizing that, even
under the substantial evidence test, judicial review is "ultimately deferen-
tial,"'46 the dissent singled out three key factors which served to make substan-
tial evidence review particularly difficult under OSHA: the high level of
technological complexity, the impossibility of achieving definite resolution of
factual issues, and the inability of avoiding policy considerations "when the
question involves determination of the acceptable level of risk [to worker
health]." 47 The dissent rejected the notion that these complications justified
the plurality's excessively demanding review, and went so far as to say that
"today's decision represents a usurpation of decisionmaking authority that has
been exercised by and properly belongs with Congress and its authorized
representatives. '48
The rationale of the dissent in-American Petroleum also was evident in the
rulings of several lower courts on the issue of substantial evidence. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,49 one of the most notable lower court
cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that the stringent, OSHA-promulgated lead exposure standard was enforce-
able even though based on "the inconclusive but suggestive results of numer-
ous studies." °50 The scope of judicial review was expressed in very narrow
terms,5 1 and the court seemed to presage Justice Marshall's dissent in Ameri-
can Petroleum when it noted, "[W]e must remember that the precise choice of
[a numerical toxic exposure limit] is essentially a legislative judgment to which
we must accord great deference and which only must fall within a 'zone of
reasonableness.' ",52
The humanitarian concerns that ultimately held sway inAmerican Textile
were also present in the United Steelworkers decision. While the court of ap-
peals faulted OSHA for being careless in some data presentation and analy-
sis,5 3 it refused to second-guess technologically complicated agency decisions
and observed that "OSHA cannot let workers suffer while it awaits the Godot
44. Id. at 695 n.9.
45. Id. at 695. The dissent believed that de novo review was "especially inappropriate" when
complicated scientific data was at issue, as the Court plainly lacked expertise in such matters. The
logical thrust of this deferential approach was that the "reviewing court must be mindful of the
limited nature of its role," even under substantial evidence review. Id. at 706.
46. Id. at 705.
47. Id. at 705-06.
48. Id. at 712.
49. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
50. Id. at 1253 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37-38 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
51. Review was restricted to "requiring the agency to identify relevant factual evidence, to
explain the logic and the policies underlying any legislative choice, to state candidly any assump-
tions on which it relies, and to present its reasons for rejecting significant contrary evidence and
argument." Id. at 1207.
52. Id. at 1253.
53. The majority proffered the slightly understated criticism that OSHA's carelessness "will
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of scientific certainty. It can and must make reasonable predictions on the
basis of 'credible sources of information. . . ."4 Although the substantial
evidence issue was remanded in regard to some secondary segments of the
steel industry, the standard was upheld in major respects, with the court noting
that "we cannot require of OSHA anything like certainty."55 The United
Steelworkers court characterized the difficulty of substantial evidence review
in clear-cut terms:
The peculiar problem of reviewing the rules of agencies like OSHA
lies in applying the substantial evidence test to regulations which are
essentially legislative and rooted in inferences from complex scien-
tific and factual data, and which often necessarily involve highly
speculative projections of technological development in areas wholly
lacking in scientific and economic certainty.56
Faced with such highly speculative projections, the United Steelworkers court
struck the balance in favor of worker health and excused data inadequacies
when the American Petroleum Court would not.5 7
In rejecting both the conceptually valid industry challenge to the substan-
tial evidence issue and the cost-benefit analysis,5 8 the American Textile Court
moved far toward adopting the reasoning of United Steelworkers and the
American Petroleum dissent. The American Textile Court therefore revealed a
strong measure of deference to administrative rulemaking authority and con-
siderable solicitude for worker health. Whereas fifty volumes of benzene data
were deemed insufficient in American Petroleum, a generous reading of the
faulty RTI and Hocutt-Thomas cotton dust studies met the substantial evi-
dence standard in American Textile.
In evaluating the feasibility of the $656.5 million total compliance figure
under section 655(f),59 the court of appeals inAmerican Textile had recognized
that the task of the court under the substantial evidence requirement was "to
provide a careful check on the agency's determinations." 60 But the court also
believed that it had great flexibility in assessing whether the evidence was sub-
stantial. This flexibility becomes the essence of the judicial review standard in
the Supreme Court opinion, and the concept of "careful check" conveniently
never place the lead exposure standard in the Pantheon of administrative proceedings." Id. at
1207.
54. Id. at 1266 (quoting AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1206-07.
57. The United Steelworkers bench found ample precedent for its holding in an early toxic
exposure case, Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which OSHA
was found to have broad discretion in the area of toxics regulation. The Hodgson court held that
when data was obtained "on the frontiers of scientific knowledge," regulations "must in that cir-
cumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual analy-
sis." Id. at 474.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2491-92. The Court was aware of the difficulty the industry faced in achiev-
ing compliance and freely admitted that "some marginal employers may shut down rather than
comply." 101 S. Ct. at 2501. Even on those facts, however, the value of worker health was
thought to preclude any mechanical application of cost-benefit analysis.
59. See note 32 supra.
60. 617 F.2d at 649.
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is omitted. The Court fully adopts the "familiar rule" that "[tihis Court will
intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial
evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misap-
plied' by the court below."' 61 Although the exposure levels contemplated by
Hocutt-Thomas were less stringent than those ultimately adopted by the Sec-
retary, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's speculation that "little
more than the dust control measures assumed by the industry [Hocutt-
Thomas] would be necessary to achieve the final PEL."'62 In spite of conflict-
ing and inapposite data, the Court nonetheless believed it was warranted in
upholding the precise and demanding cotton dust standard mandated by the
Secretary.63
A requirement of scientifically impeccable data and careful economic bal-
ancing undoubtedly would have been particularly inappropriate in the case of
brown lung disease. Due to increased popular awareness of the dangers of
toxic exposure, the class protected by the cotton dust standard engendered
considerable public sympathy. The facts of American Textile offered the
Court a perfect opportunity to recognize that neither a compendium of abso-
lute scientific truth nor a mathematically precise economic analysis was
mandatory where considerations of high technology response to imperfectly
understood incidence of disease were involved.
Nonetheless, the legal foundation of the Court's decision is open to chal-
lenge. Had it not been for the emotional appeal of the protected class, the
cotton dust standards might well have been invalidated because they were
based on insubstantial evidence. Justice Stewart's dissent clearly echoes the
demanding concept of substantial evidence review articulated in American Pe-
troleum and suggests that the agency badly overstepped its bounds in promul-
gating cotton dust standards based on grossly insufficient evidence. 64 Neither
the RTI nor the Hocutt-Thomas study was geared to the standards ultimately
adopted. In addition, both studies suffered from assorted methodological in-
adequacies. 65 As Justice Stewart correctly noted, even feasibility analysis can-
not be made without substantial evidence. His dissent attacked the majority
decision for this very reason:
The agency flatly rejected [the RTI] prediction as a gross over-esti-
mate. . . . [Then] [t]he agency examined the Hocutt-Thomas study,
and concluded that it too was an over-estimate of the costs of the less
stringent standard it was addressing... . But in a remarkable non se-
quitur, the agency decided that because the Hocutt-Thomas study
was an over-estimate of the cost of a less stringent standard, it could
be treated as a reliable estimate for the more costly final Standard
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,491 (1951)).
62. 617 F.2d at 660.
63. The Court did refuse, however, to "scrutinize the record to uncover and formulate a
rationale" for the transfer with pay provision. 101 S. Ct. at 2505 n.73. That issue was remanded
for further examination in the court below and thus represented the industry's sole success in its
challenge to the standards.
64. Id. at 2506-07.
65. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 60
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER OSHA
actually promulgated, never rationally explaining how it came to this
happy conclusion. This is not substantial evidence. It is unsup-
ported speculation.66
In light of the Court's demanding substantial evidence review in American
Petroleum, Justice Stewart's dissent seems well taken. The rigorous cast of
mind that prevailed on the American Petroleum bench perhaps was tempered
by the more obvious peril to the cotton worker considered inAmerican Textile.
While the carcinogenic qualities of benzene at low levels were open to dispute,
the fact that byssinosis "affected as many as 30% of the workers [in some pro-
duction processes] in some American cotton mills" was fairly clear.67 The
public appeal of the cause in American Textile allowed the Court to direct its
focus away from the substantial evidence requirement of section 655(f) and
instead to speak of the "best available evidence" required by section
655(b)(5). 68 In effect, the American Textile decision may be read as at least a
partial fulfillment of Justice Marshall's predictions in the American Petroleum
dissent:
In all likelihood, [4merican Petroleum] will come to be regarded as
an extreme reaction to a regulatory scheme that, as the Members of
the plurality perceived it, imposed an unduly harsh burden on regu-
lated industries. . . . I am confident that the approach taken by the
plurality today. . . will eventually be abandoned, and that the rep-
resentative branches of government will once again be allowed to
determine the level of safety and health protection to be accorded to
the American worker.69
In minimizing the rigorous demands of the substantial evidence standard
of review, the Supreme Court plainly followed the spirit of the court of ap-
peals' holding inAmerican Textile.70 The lower court had predicated its hold-
ing on the fact that Congress "delegated unusually broad discretionary
authority" to OSHA for the issuance of regulations. 71 The court evidenced an
extremely deferential attitude toward agency determinations when it noted
that "[tlo protect workers from material health impairments, OSHA must rely
on predictions of possible future events and extrapolations from limited data.
It may have to fill gaps in knowledge with policy considerations." 72 Likewise,
the Supreme Court voiced a similar flexibility, rather than the exacting tone of
the earlierAmerican Petroleum decision, when it noted and readily excused the
fact that "both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on assump-
tions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the validity of their
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2507.
67. 448 U.S. at 646. See also note 15 supra.
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(5), 655(f) (1976).
69. 448 U.S. at 723-24.
70. 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
71. Id. at 649.
72. Id. at 651. The court went on to note that "standards do not become infeasible simply
because they may impose substantial costs on an industry, force the development of new technol-
ogy, or even force some employers out of business. Otherwise the Act's commitment to protect
workers might be forever frustrated." Id. at 655.
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final numerical cost estimates."'73
The key issue in future litigation may well be just how much "havoc" the
Court will allow before invalidating standards under the section 655(1) stan-
dard of review. The wide divergence of approaches to judicial review evi-
denced by American Textile and American Petroleum does not lend itself to a
natural synthesis, but some directions of the Court are discernible. First, in-
dustrial noncooperation will not be tolerated lightly. Because the Secretary
had been limited in the precision of his estimates "by the industry's refusal to
make more of its own data available," 74 the industry was not readily heard to
complain once final standards were enacted.
Second, by strictly limiting its review function and simply "declin[ing] to
hold as a matter of law"75 that OSHA's determination was unsupported by
substantial evidence, the Court may have given a first hint of abdicating the
field of rigorous review so willingly entered in American Petroleum. As Milton
Wright of RTI noted, "We establish bounds on the costs. We're encouraged to
do so by the agencies."'76 "Hard evidence is almost non-existent" 77 for certain
textile production stages, and the absence of data on other aspects of cotton
dust exposure has been termed "particularly regrettable" 78 and "especially un-
fortunate."'79 Bounds and nonexistent data are hardly the stuff of which truly
meaningful substantial evidence review can be made. Mr. Wright termed the
Secretary's conclusions "fairly logical."80 Perhaps after American Textile sub-
stantial evidence will come to be regarded as "fair logic" in protective veneer.
Third, even though the Court commited itself to a liberal interpretation of
substantial evidence in American Textile, a major question remains as to ex-
actly how far the Court will go in employing the substantial evidence review as
a validation device for extremely costly industrial regulation. Substantial evi-
dence may well demonstrate increased risk to worker health as industrial
processes grow in sophistication and in toxic exposure levels, but a delicate
balance ultimately must be struck between protective regulation and the sur-
vival of the industry under review. The American Textile Court explicitly re-
fused to decide "the question whether a Standard that threatens the long-term
profitability and competitiveness of an industry is 'feasible' within the mean-
ing of. . .29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)."81I When faced with the possibility of indus-
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2500 n.54.
74. Id. at 2500. Hocutt referred to the confidentiality of his sources during committee hear-
ings. Id. at 2500 n.51. On the other hand, Milton Wright of RTI, who supervised the engineering
control estimates, remembered that the industry was "willing to be cooperative" and "didn't hesi-
tate" to supply data when requested. However, Mr. Wright did not note that complete industry-
wide data were not available and that the lack of a central source complicated estimate proce-
dures. Interview with Milton Wright, Consultant, RTI, in Research Triangle Park, N.C. (Nov. 18,
1981).
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2500.
76. Interview, supra note 74 (emphasis added).
77. Id. (referring to weaving).
78. RTI, supra note 17, at vol. 1, 11-3.
79. Id. at 111-6.
80. Interview, supra note 74.
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2501 n.55.
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trial demise and resulting economic dislocation, the Court may feel itself
constrained to preserve worker employment at the expense of worker health.
This problem may become particularly acute in times of mounting concern
over the debilitating effects of unemployment upon the nation as a whole.
Some degree of judicial experimentation in this regard is to be expected in
future litigation, with the Act's provision for industrial petition for variance in
compliance serving as a buffer against the economic shock of restrictive
regulation.82
It is to be hoped that such future judicial experimentation in review of
agency action will preserve the element of concern for human well-being so
eloquently expressed inAmerican Textile. At bottom, it is precisely this sort of
policy determination that lies at the core of the American Textile decision. An
attempt to incorporate absolute quantification into such policy-making plainly
would have elevated industry profit above worker health. In this respect, the
Court's deferential treatment of the substantial evidence standard of review in
American Textile is to be welcomed as a necessary and sensible response to a
pressing human need.
GEORGIA L. HERRING
82. 29 U.S.C. § 655(d) (1976) makes specific provision for variance from standards promul-
gated by OSHA, allowing "[a]ny affected employer [to] apply to the Secretary for a rule or order
r a variance."
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Evidence--State v. Freeman: Adverse Marital Testimony in
North Carolina Criminal Actions-Can Spousal Testimony
Be Compelled?
Prior to the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Free-
man1 adverse testimony by one spouse against another in a criminal action
2
was deemed incompetent and therefore inadmissible.3 This common-law rule
of incompetent spousal testimony prohibited the state from calling as a witness
the husband or wife of any criminal defendant, with certain, limited, statutory
exceptions. 4 In Freeman the court announced a major modification of the
common-law rule by holding that henceforth the spouse of a criminal defend-
ant shall be an incompetent witness for the state only when the substance of
the testimony concerns a "confidential communication" between the marriage
partners made during the duration of their marriage.5
The facts of the case presented the court with a compelling setting for
modifying the common-law rule. Defendant Freeman was indicted for first-
degree murder. Defendant's wife of three years (though she and her husband
had been separated for the last two) was prepared to testify that on June 6,
1980, she saw her husband shoot and kill her brother as she and her brother
sat in an automobile outside Mrs. Freeman's place of employment. 6 The trial
court granted defendant's motion in limine to suppress the testimony on the
ground that under the common law of North Carolina, codified at G.S. 8-57,7
a spouse is incompetent to testify against a defendant-spouse in a criminal
1. 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981).
2. Adverse spousal testimony in most civil actions is competent and compellable. Excep-
tions include actions for divorce on account of adultery and actions for criminal conversation.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1981).
3. The common-law rule is expressed in State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 123 (1852).
4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981) provides:
The husband or wife of the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings, shall be a
competent witness for the defendant, but the failure of such witness to be examined shall
not be used to the prejudice of the defense. Every such person examined as a witness
shall be subject to be cross-examined as are other witnesses. No husband or wife shall be
compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during
their marriage. Nothing herein shall render any spouse competent or compellable to
give evidence against the spouse in any criminal action or proceeding, except to prove
the fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annulment in
cases of bigamy and in cases of criminal cohabitation in violation of the provisions of
G.S. 14-183, and except that in all criminal prosecutions of a spouse for communicating
a threat to the other spouse, or in any criminal prosecution of a spouse for trespass in or
upon the separate residence of the other spouse when living separate and apart from
each other by mutual consent or by court order, or for any criminal offense against a
legitimate or illegitimate or adopted or foster minor child of either spouse, or for aban-
donment, or for neglecting to provide for the spouse's support, or the support of the
children of such spouse, it shall be lawful to examine a spouse in behalf of the State
against the other spouse: Provided that this section shall not affect pending litigation
relating to a criminal offense against a minor child.
5. 302 N.C. at 596, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
6. Id. at 592-93, 276 S.E.2d at 451-52.
7. See note 4 supra.
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proceeding. 8 The state immediately appealed the order pursuant to G.S. 15A-
979(c),9 certifying that Mrs. Freeman was the only witness who could testify to
the above stated facts, and that her testimony was essential to the case.
Before modifying the rule, the court first had to hold that G.S. 8-57 did
not codify the common-law rule prohibiting adverse spousal testimony in
criminal trials. The statutory language on which the trial court relied was the
portion of G.S. 8-57 that reads: "Nothing herein shall render any spouse com-
petent or compellable to give evidence against the other spouse in any criminal
action or proceeding. . ... 0o The supreme court acknowledged that if this
language did in fact codify the common-law rule, the court was without power
to modify it judicially. 11 The court previously had addressed this precise issue
in State v. Alford,12 in 'which it modified the common-law rule to permit a
divorced spouse to testify against her ex-husband-defendant.' 3 There the
court held that G.S. 8-57 simply provides that in all proceedings not specifi-
cally excepted in the statute, common-law rules with reference to whether one
spouse is competent to testify against another are unaffected by the statute.
The court observed that the portion of G.S. 8-57 quoted above differs from the
portion immediately preceding it. The latter provides directly and positively
that "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential
communication made by one to the other during their marriage."' 14 The court
reasoned that the legislature would have used similarly definitive language
had it intended to state positively that adverse spousal testimony in general
was incompetent.' 5 It concluded that by using nondefinitive language the leg-
islature simply was expressing no opinion on this aspect of the common-law
rule. Thus, absent any legislative declaration, the supreme court possesses the
authority to alter judicially created common law when it deems such action
necessary "in light of experience and reason."' 1
6
With the statutory impediment thereby removed, the court proceeded to
reassess the continuing validity of the spousal incompetency rule. After a brief
8. 302 N.C. at 592, 276 S.E.2d at 451.
9. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981) allows an immediate appeal of a supe-
rior court order granting a motion to suppress evidence if the prosecutor certifies that the appeal is
not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is essential to the case.
When this section and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a) (1981), which provides for a direct appeal
to the supreme court in capital offense cases, are considered together, it is proper to appeal a
suppression order directly to the supreme court if the punishment for the charge is either death or
life imprisonment. State v. Silhan, 295 N.C. 636, 639-40, 247 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1978).
10. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452. See note 4 supra for full text of the provision.
11. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
12. 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968).
13. The court in Freeman could have held that a two-year separation was the equivalent of
divorce for purposes of the spousal privilege, but it expressly declined to do so. The reason behind
the abolition of the privilege in divorced spouses could apply equally in this case-there is no true
marital relationship to protect. The court declined to so hold for two reasons: (1) public policy
favors encouraging reconciliation between separated spouses, and (2) the courts would be unduly
burdened if required to make findings on the possibility of reconciliation in each case. 302 N.C. at
598 n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 455 n.2.
14. 274 N.C. at 129, 161 S.E.2d at 578.
15. Id.
16. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
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discussion of the historical development of the rule,17 the court concluded that
the doctrine prohibiting one spouse from testifying against the other remains
in effect solely by force of the modem justification of encouraging free and
open communication between marriage partners. It is thought that open com-
munication might be impaired if spouses run the risk of a subsequent betrayal
of confidence.18 A rule that prohibits all adverse spousal testimony "sweeps
more broadly"' 9 than its purpose and therefore should be modified. Open
communication between marriage partners could be encouraged just as effec-
tively by a rule that limits the exclusion of testimony only if its substance con-
cers a confidential communication.20
. The narrow holding of Freeman is that nonconfidential adverse spousal
testimony in criminal proceedings is now competent. The court did not ad-
dress the question whether such testimony is also compellable.21 It is submit-
ted, however, that because the court recognized the sole justification for the
rule as existing in the policy of encouraging free and open communication in
the marriage, it inadvertently may have suggested an affirmative answer to this
question. This note examines two additional modem justifications for the
common-law rule-maintaining peace between the marriage partners and
avoiding the moral repugnance of forcing one spouse to condemn a life-long
partner-both of which support a rule that makes adverse spousal testimony
noncompellable.
At the outset it is important to distinguish between three separate com-
mon-law exclusionary doctrines: the privilege against adverse marital testi-
mony in general; the disqualification of one spouse to testify on the other's
behalf; and the privilege for confidential communications between husband
17. The court in one sentence surveyed the historic origins of the privilege. Id. This sen-
tence, however, describes the genesis of an entirely distinct rule of common law, the disqualifica-
tion of favorable spousal testimony. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
18. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453. The notion that open communication might be im-
paired if spouses were subject to the risk of betrayal is similar in rationale to the privileges for
communications between attorney and client, doctor and patient, and clergyman and penitent.
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). See Guy v. Avery County Bank, 206 N.C. 322,
173 S.E. 600 (1934) (attorney); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199, 139 S.E, 228(1927) (physician).
19. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
20. The court stated that in determining whether a particular segment of testimony includes a
"confidential communication" within the meaning of the rule adopted in this case, deference
should be given to its previous decisions interpreting the term under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-56 (1981),
the statute preserving a privilege in civil actions not to testify about "confidential communica-
tions" with one's spouse. Id. at 597-98, 276 S.E. 2d at 454. These cases hold that the question is
whether the communication, whatever it contains, was induced by the marital relationship and
prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by such relationship. Hence, a
communication made in the known presence of a third person or a communication relating to
business matters which by their nature might be expected to be divulged are not protected. Hicks
v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967); 1 D. Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence § 60, at
192 (H. Brandis rev. 1973). Interestingly, the rule laid down by the court-that confidential com-
munications between husband and wife are privileged in criminal actions-is already codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981): "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confi-
dential communication made by one to the other during their marriage."
21. Since Mrs. Freeman had volunteered her testimony, the court did not have to address the
issue of compellability. See State v. Byrd, 21 N.C. App. 734, 736, 205 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1974), for
the proposition that the privilege embodies distinct issues of competency and compellability.
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and wife. Judicial confusion of these doctrines has been frequent,22 and the
Freeman court commingled all three.
The origins of the common-law privilege against adverse marital testi-
mony in general are couched in obscurity.23 The privilege appeared as early
as 1580 in the case of Bent v. Allot 24 in which a husband was allowed to sup-
press the testimony of his wife when she was called as a witness for his oppo-
nent. While the original justification for the privilege is uncertain, Professor
Wigmore suggests that the court of chancery may have drawn upon analogies
to the Roman civil and the ecclesiastical law, which disqualified spouses, de-
pendents, parents and servants.25 This analogy fails, however, to explain why
the common-law judges privileged only spousal testimony while permitting
that of all other members of the defendant's household. 26 Professor Wigmore
concludes that perhaps the true explanation of the rule's origin lies in a "natu-
ral and strong repugnance" toward condemning a man by admitting to the
witness stand one who lived under his roof, shared the secrets of his domestic
life and depended on him for sustenance. 27 This would tend to explain why
nearly all the recorded instances of the privilege deal with the dependent
wife's testimony against her husband and not vice versa.28
The disqualification of favorable spousal testimony first appeared as an
established principle around 1628 when the English courts generally recog-
nized any "interest" as a ground for disqualification. 29 The conclusion that
the privilege arose before the disqualification is evident from the observation
by the court in Bent v. Allot that the defendant would have been permitted to
call his wife to testify on his behalf.30 The disqualification branch of the rule
was premised on two canons of medieval jurisprudence: first, the accused
himself was prevented from testifying because of his interest in the outcome;
and second, testimony from the wife was the legal equivalent of testimony
from the husband, because husband and wife were considered a single legal
22. Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications Between Husband and Wife, 15 N.C.L.
Rev. 282, 283 (1937).
23. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
24. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580). The privilege was engraved firmly into the common law in
the early part of the seventeenth centry when Lord Coke pronounced: "Note, it hath been resolved
by the justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband. ... and it might
be a cause of implacable discord and dissertation between the husband and wife. ... 1 E.
Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton § 6b (1628). The first recorded common-law exception to
this rule came only three years later in Lord Audley's Trial, 123 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1631), in which
the judges resolved that the wife could be a witness against her husband for rape upon her. This
common-law exception is codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981), reproduced at note 4 supra.
25. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 600 (3d ed. 1940); 8 id. § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
26. See State v. Parish, 104 N.C. 679, 10 S.E. 457 (1889) (daughter against father); 8 J. Wig-
more, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
28. Id.
29. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 600 (3d ed. 1940). Lord Coke's pronouncement in 1628 (see
note 24 supra) is the first recorded utterance of the disqualification of favorable spousal testimony.
Lord Coke's coupling of the privilege and the disqualification in the same sentence may have
contributed to the confusion of the two doctrines. Reference to the disqualification first appeared
in North Carolina in the case of Beatty's Heirs v. [sic], I N.C. (Tay.) 104 (1799).




The privilege for communications between husband and wife did not ap-
pear until the middle of the nineteenth century.32 This privilege was unneces-
sary until the statutory modification of the rules concerning marital
disqualification and privilege against adverse testimony, and this modification
explains its delayed recognition.33 The motivation for the privilege was to
instill confidence between marital partners34 by encouraging open
communications.
The court in Freeman was confronted with only the first of these doc-
trines, the privilege against adverse marital testimony. In its analysis of the
reasons for the privilege, however, it introduced aspects of all three rules and,
not surprisingly, mingled the relevant issues. The court adopted as the histori-
cal origin of the privilege against adverse testimony the original justification
for the disqualification of favorable testimony-the disqualification of the
spouse based upon the defendant's interest in the outcome coupled with the
marital unity concept of medieval law.35 After summarily dismissing this jus-
tification as anachronistic, the court turned to the modern reason for the rule:
to encourage interspousal communication 36 -the very motivation for the sepa-
rate privilege for confidential communications 37 -and concluded that this
31. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 601 (3d ed. 1940). The disqualification in criminal actions was
abolished by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1981), which reads in pertinent part, "The husband or wife of
the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings, shall be a competent witness for the defend-
ant .... Disqualification was the rule in federal courts until it was abolished in Frank v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
32. See, e.g., State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838); Hester v. Hester, 15 N.C.
(4 Dev.) 228 (1833).
33. Note, supra note 22, at 283 n.2.
34. State v. Jolly, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 108 (1838). Professor Wigmore argues that the
policy that should lie at the foundation of every rule of privileged communications (i.e., attorney-
client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, husband-wife) can be broken down into four requirements:
(1) the communications originate in confidence; (2) the confidence is essential to the relationship;
(3) the relation is a proper object of encouragement by the state; and (4) the injury that would
result by its disclosure is probably greater than the resulting benefit to the fact-finding process. 8
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2332 (McNaughton rev. 1961). He suggests that the fourth condition is
the only one subject to debate. Id.
The privilege for confidential marital communications is codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57
(1981). See note 20 supra.
35. 302 N.C. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452. The North Carolina court is not alone in confusing
the origins of these two separate, exclusionary rules. The United States Supreme Court in Tram-
mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), made a similar mistake. The Trammel court did, how-
ever, recognize that it was dealing with two distinct rules, one a privilege vested in the defendant-
spouse and the other an outright disqualification for incompetent testimony. The North Carolina
court erroneously refers to both as rules of disqualification. See 302 N.C. at 594-95, 276 S.E.2d at
452.
36. 302 N.C. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 452-53.
37. Why the court confused the justifications for these two privileges is a mystery. The
supreme court clearly distinguished between the two in State v. Alford, 274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d
575 (1968). Professor Wigmore treats the two as separate privileges, each having an entirely dis-
tinct justification. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2334 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Likewise, the
Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, which ostensibly was relied upon heavily in Free.
man, expressly stated that its decision did not affect the "independent rule protecting confidential
marital communications." 445 U.S. at 51. What is clear is that by citing the confidentiality justifi-
cation as supporting the privilege against adverse marital testimony in general, the court avoided
any independent analysis of the reasons for retaining the latter privilege.
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purpose could be served by the narrower rule, which recognized only a privi-
lege arising out of marital communications. This was not a very startling con-
clusion, given the assumed justification for the privilege. Had the court
focused its inquiry on other accepted justifications for the privilege against
adverse marital testimony, however, it might have reached a different result.
Since the genesis of the privilege against adverse marital testimony in the
sixteenth century, two theories in favor of retaining the common-law rule fre-
quently have been advanced by judges and commentators. The first and most
often employed of the modem justifications for the privilege is the preserva-
tion of peace and harmony in the marriage relationship. 38 It is thought that
condemning one's spouse might cause some discord between marriage part-
ners.39 The peace-and-harmony argument was given considerable attention
by the United States Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United States4° and more
recently in Trammel v. United States.41
In Hawkins defendant was convicted and sentenced to five years' impris-
onment by a United States district court for violating the Mann Act 42 by trans-
porting a girl across state lines for immoral purposes. Over defendant's
objection, the district court permitted the government to use his wife as a wit-
ness against him. In reversing the conviction the court deferred to the public
policy of promoting marital harmony:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a
belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not
only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit
of the public as well .... The wide-spread success achieved by
courts throughout the country in conciliating family differences is a
real indication that some apparently broken homes can be saved pro-
vided no unforgivable act is done by either party. Adverse testimony
given in a criminal proceeding would, we think, be likely to destroy
almost any marriage.
43
The rule laid down in Hawkins was later modified in Trammel when the
Court held that the government could use defendant's spouse as a witness, but
only if the testifying spouse consented. Thus, the spouse's testimony is compe-
38. The first recorded statement of this policy reason probably was Coke's pronouncement in
note 24 supra. For other early statements of the justification, see Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep.
171 (1736); F. Buller, Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius (1767), at 286(a) (7th
ed. R. Bridgman 1817) (1st ed. Dublin 1768).
39. Preservation of peace and harmony in the marriage, together with the marital identity
concept, was also the rationale behind the common-law rule prohibiting one spouse from suing
the other in tort. Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923). In 1951 the legislature
provided that husband and wife could sue each other in all tort actions. Note, Survey of Statutory
Changes: Torts Between Husband and Wife, 29 N.C.L. Rev. 395 (1951). That legislative change is
now codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-5 (1976).
40. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
41. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970).
43. 358 U.S. at 77-78.
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tent, but not compellable.44 In so holding, however, the Court did not suggest
that the preservation of marital harmony was no longer a viable justification
for the privilege. On the contrary, in vesting the privilege in the testifying
spouse, the Court reaffirmed its policy of furthering the "important public in-
terest in marital harmony. '45 The Court overruled Hawkins only because it
felt that when one spouse chooses to testify against the other there is little, if
any, marital harmony to protect. 46
The other argument supporting the privilege for adverse spousal testi-
mony approaches the issue as a simple value judgment: because the marital
relationship is based upon a deep and enduring trust between husband and
wife unequalled in any other human bond, the gains to society in nurturing
that trust and in avoiding the torment inherent in compelling a betrayal of that
trust outweigh the burdens placed upon the fact-finding process.
One application of this principle is stated by Professor Wigmore as a
"natural repugnance" in all fair-minded persons toward compelling a wife or
husband to be "the means of the other's condemnation," and toward compel-
ling the defendant to suffer "the humiliation of being condemned by the words
of his intimate life partner."47 Other commentators have emphasized the tor-
ment of the testifying spouse.48 The argument is that the testifying spouse is
presented with a painful moral dilemma-a choice between remaining loyal
through perjury or betraying the marital trust by telling the truth.
Whether to ensure the emotional stability of the testifying spouse or that
44. This is currently the rule in all federal criminal proceedings. See Labbe v. Berman, 621
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1980).
45. 445 U.S. at 53.
46. Id. at 52. The Court cited two contemporary reports as support for its view that marital
harmony deserves less protection when the spouse volunteers testimony. In 1965, California ter-
minated the privilege in the defendant-spouse, but vested it in the witness-spouse, accepting a
study commission recommendation that the "latter [was] more likely than the former to determine
whether or not to claim the privilege on the basis of the probable effect on the marital relation-
ship." Id. at 49-50 n.10 (citing Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § § 970-973 (West 1966) and 1 California
Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendation and Study Relating to the Marital "For or Against"
Testimonial Privilege, at F-5 (1956)).
In 1972 a study group in England proposed vesting the privilege in the testifying spouse
alone, on the ground that "if [the wife] is willing to give evidence.., the law would be showing
excessive concern for the preservation of marital harmony if it were to say she must not do so."
445 U.S. at 50 n.10 (citing (British) Criminal Law Rev., Eleventh Report Evidence (General)
(1972) at 93.)
Professor Wigmore would take the argument even further, postulating that it is absurd to
assume that a normal, harmonious marriage is endangered solely by the obligation to testify unfa-
vorably. He continues, "[It is] a curious piece of policy by which the wrongdocr's own interests
are consulted in determining whether justice shall have its course against him." 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
47. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Because Professor Wigmore
finds the marital harmony argument unpersuasive, this value judgment is for him the sole strength
of the opposition to abolishing the privilege. For other statements of the natural repugnance to
condemning a man by the words of his spouse, see Mills v. United States, 1 Pin. 73 (Wis. 1839)
("indelible disgrace. . . and he may be the subject of the deepest mortification which a sensitive
being can endure."); Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 (1867) ('out of respect for the better feelings
of humanity").
48. See 2 Abbott, The Trial of Henry Ward Beecher [Tilton v. Beecher, City of Brooklyn,
N.Y.] (1875), cited in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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of the defendant, the argument is in essence that society's interest in ascertain-
ing the truth does not outweigh the suffering inflicted upon the spouse. Profes-
sor Wigmore, after acknowledging that there is indeed a natural repugnance to
condemning a man by the testimony of his intimate life-partner, concludes
that the balance comes out in favor of admitting the testimony. He views the
argument as nothing more than idle sentiment.49 When a man has been ac-
cused of committing a crime, it is the "solemn business" of the law to find out
whether he is guilty, and in this inquiry there is no room for sentiment.50
Jeremy Bentham, when presented with the dilemma of the suffering testi-
fying spouse, took an even more dispassionate view when he proposed that
inflicting such punishment upon the spouse should act as a deterrent to the
prospective criminal.51 According to Bentham, not only is the torment of the
spouse an insufficient reason to impede our search for truth, it is also a poten-
tially effective method of crime prevention. 52
The positions taken by these two legal scholars may indeed reflect a
proper value judgment-perhaps the emotional distress to either spouse is so
insignificant that it is not worth protecting. On the other hand, if we assume
that there is some psychic trauma that can be prevented by a rule excluding
adverse spousal testimony, it may be that Wigmore, Bentham and others who
disparage the moral reprehensibility justification place too great an emphasis
on society's need to discover the truth and not enough on other equally valid
objectives of a system of justice. Privilege always excludes some testimony
that could aid in discovering the truth.53 If courts could coerce confessions in
violation of the fifth amendment, no doubt more guilty defendants would be
convicted, yet our system of justice does not tolerate such inhumane violations
of the human personality.54 Truth-at-all-costs never has been the rule. The
administration of justice was created for society, not society for the adminis-
tration of justice.55 If it is accepted that the trust reposed in the marriage
relationship is unequalled elsewhere, reasonable persons may determine that
our morals do not tolerate adverse marital testimony. Betrayal of this trust
indeed may be naturally repugnant and morally reprehensible.56 Dismissing
49. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50. Id.
51. 5 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 344 (London 1827). Bentham contends that
the privilege turns a man's home into a "den of thieves" Id. at 340.
52. Bentham's position is difficult to take seriously. Two of the argument's more obvious
defects are its obliviousness to the difficult position of the witness-spouse and the rule's almost
certainly negligible effect as a deterrent.
53. See Note, Evidence: Federal Courts: Adverse Testimony by Spouse of Accused in a
Criminal Prosecution, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 472, 474 (1936), which suggests that the basis of criticism
of the privilege is that the accused is thought to be guilty, while the presumption of law is that he
is innocent. The damage to marital harmony and suffering of a man wrongfully accused and
properly acquitted also must be considered.
54. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
55. 2 Abbott, supra note 48, at 49-50.
56. For a defense of the privilege on moral grounds, see Note, The Search for "Reason and
Experience" Under the Funk Doctrine, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 525 (1950).
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this moral judgment as mere "sentiment" which must defer to the "solemn
business" of ascertaining the truth misses the point.
Given that there is some public good to be gained, the question must be
whether the moral reprehensibility of one spouse's condemnation of the other
is sufficiently strong to overcome the burdens placed upon the fact-finding
process.57 The balance may not necessarily favor retention of the privilege. In
the first place, if any public good is to be gained by allowing the privilege, it
must be assumed that a husband and wife actually would be placed in a diffi-
cult moral dilemma when forced to testify about nonconfidential matters. Sec-
ond, it is not necessarily true that the trust reposed in the marital bond is
greater than that found in other close societal and familial relationships which
enjoy no similar privilege.58
The strength of both the value-based moral reprehensibility argument
and the marital harmony argument depends to some extent on whether or not
the testifying spouse is compelled to testify. From the testifying spouse's view-
point, the moral dilemma, real or not, is avoided by a rule that makes testi-
mony competent, but not compellable, as in the federal rule after Trammel. If
a spouse wishes to avoid the torment of betrayal under that rule, the alterna-
tive simply is to decline the invitation to testify.59 Similarly, the state's interest
in promoting marital harmony may be stronger in cases where a spouse re-
fuses to testify. If the view of the Supreme Court in Trammel is accepted, 60
there is more harmony to protect when one spouse elects not to condemn the
other.61
The Freeman decision has cast considerable doubt on the issue of the
compellability of adverse marital testimony in North Carolina. If the court
remains committed solely to the confidential communications justification for
57. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) and
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) for the proposition that because exclusionary rules
and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public has a right to all evidence,
they are permitted only in the limited circumstances of a transcendent public good.
58. See Anonymous, 123 Eng. Rep. 656 (1613) (son bound to testify against father, but wife is
not).
59. The decision not to testify may not be so simple in cases like Trammel, where the wife is
offered immunity in exchange for her testimony. This suggests that the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that Trammel's marriage probably was beyond repair may have been incorrect. It is possible
that a reasonably happily married spouse would choose to testify rather than face an extended
prison term.
60. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
61. On the other hand, a rule making adverse spousal testimony competent but not compella-
ble will not serve to lessen the humiliation of the defendant-spouse. In fact, assuming there is any
humiliation at all, a defendant-spouse arguably would be more embarrassed when his partner
chooses to testify than if the spouse were forced to do so.
Similarly, if any peace and harmony remain in the marriage of a cooperative spousal witness,
it may be promoted more effectively by a rule that prohibits even noncompelled testimony. As the
Court in Hawkins suggested, it seems probable that much more bitterness would be engendered by
voluntary condemnation than by compelled testimony. 358 U.S. at 77. The Supreme Court in
Trammel takes a contrary position. In a case where both spouses are potential defendants, the
state is unlikely to offer one of them immunity and lenient treatment if it knows that the other can
prevent the adverse testimony. Thus, the privilege can have the untoward effect of permitting one
spouse to escape justice at the expense of the other. This situation, the Court argues, hardly seems
conducive to preservation of marital harmony. 445 U.S. at 52-53.
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the privilege, it would follow that a spouse's testimony about nonconfidential
matters should be compellable as well as competent. The view that noncom-
municative adverse spousal testimony may be compellable derives from the
court's reasoning that the only modem justification for the privilege is to en-
courage open communication between marriage partners. The underlying ra-
tionale of the justification is that spouses will be less likely to confide in one
another if they know that the confidant may someday reveal the substance of
the conversation in court. Thus, in order to foster the policy, the privileged
testimony must concern some communication between spouses. If the sub-
stance of the testimony is not a confidential communiction (e.g., an eyewitness
account of a murder), then it makes little difference whether that testimony is
compelled or not. Free communication will not be inhibited at all by the fear
that one's spouse may someday be forced to testify about a noncommunicative
observation. 62 Nor will it be encouraged by the knowledge that one's spouse
cannot be required to testify to such an observation. Thus, on the facts of the
Freeman case and in any other situation where the testimony at issue does not
involve interspousal communications, an extension of the court's reasoning
would permit the spouse's testimony to be compelled.
The Freeman court was driven to reach its conclusion mainly because of
its failure to recognize the distinct policy reasons behind the general privilege
preventing all spousal testimony and the privilege preventing testimony about
confidential matters. In a future case that raises the compulsion issue, the
court should address and evaluate the competing policy interests behind the
general privilege and decide which are more legitimate. It may then decide to
align itself with the Trammel decision.63 However, because the court appar-
ently was cognizant of the new federal rule and of the rule's status in nearly
every other jurisdiction," it might be assumed that the members of the court
were aware of the policy reasons supporting retention of the privilege in the
testifying spouse and simply were not persuaded by them. But the fact that the
court did not address either of two longstanding justifications for the rule sug-
gests that such an assumption may not be warranted.
Promoting marital harmony and preventing the testifying spouse's moral
dilemma are legitimate goals of our judicial system. The court should recog-
nize their validity as justifications for the privilege against adverse spousal tes-
timony in criminal actions and, when the occasion arises, judiciously weigh
their importance against society's interest in ascertaining truth. If the court
62. One's freedom to commit incriminating acts in the presence of one's spouse arguably will
be inhibited by a rule that permits the state to compel testimony about those acts. It seems doubt-
ful, however, that the state should have an interest m protecting such behavior. Unlike the protec-
tion of confidential discourse, which encourages trust between husband and wife, the protection of
unlawful acts made in the presence of one's spouse appears to foster no legitimate state purpose.
63. Other jurisdictions are divided on the privilege. Seven states provide that spouses are
completely incompetent to testify against each other in a criminal proceeding. Sixteen states pro-
vide a privilege against adverse spousal testimony and vest the privilege in both spouses or in the
defendant-spouse alone. Nine states plus the District of Columbia vest a privilege in the witness-
spouse alone. The remaining seventeen states have abolished the privilege altogether. For statu-
tory citations, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n.9.
64. See 302 N.C. at 596 n.1, 276 S.E.2d at 453 n.l.
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perceives the potential harm to the marriage and testifying spouse as particu-
larly significant when the spouse is forced to testify, it should conclude that
society is better served by a rule that makes adverse spousal testimony compe-
tent but not compellable.
JAMES P. NEHF
Landlord-Tenant--pinks v. Taylor and G.S. 42-26: Abolition of
Self-Help Evictions in North Carolina
The issue of a landlord's right to use self-help for evicting residential ten-
ants was addressed during the summer of 1981 by both the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the North Carolina General Assembly. The supreme
court, in Spinks v. Taylor,' ruled that the existence of North Carolina's sum-
mary ejectment procedures2 did not preclude a landlord's use of peaceful self-
help measures in evicting tenants who are in default of rental payments. Ten
days later, the General Assembly enacted "An Act to Clarify Landlord Evic-
tion Remedies in Residential Tenancies."' 3 This legislative action bars all use
of landlord self-help, including peaceful measures. Thus, currently a land-
lord's only available eviction remedy against residential tenants is through the
courts.
4
The law of landlord self-help has had a long and confusing history al-
though it has been subject to increasing clarification in recent years.5 As with
most property matters, the legal heritage of landlord-tenant relations is Eng-
lish, medieval and agrarian. 6 At early common law, a landlord (or any person
entitled to possession of land) could forcibly evict a tenant not legally entitled
to possession.7 Subsequently, in 1381, Parliament made forcible dispossession
1. 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981). The case involved two separate actions brought on
behalf of two separate tenants. The actions were consolidated by order of the District Court of
Guilford County. Brief for Appellee at 1-2, Spinks. Only the Spinks action, based on a verified
complaint, survived the supreme court's review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment on
behalf of the defendant. 303 N.C. at 264, 278 S.E.2d at 504-05.
2. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 (1976). See notes 6-33 and accompanying text infra.
3. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, [1981] 6 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 238 (to be codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 42-25.1 to -25.4, 44A-2). See notes 39-47 and accompanying text infra.
4. "It is the public policy of the State of North Carolina, in order to maintain the public
peace, that a residential tenant shall be evicted, dispossessed or otherwise constructively or actu-
ally removed from his dwelling unit only in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 3
of this Chapter [summary ejectment proceedings]." Id. at § I (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 42-25.1). Section I of the Act also prohibits distress and distraint (seizure of personal property
for rent past due). Id. (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.2).
5. Appellate and statutory clarifications appear to result from the availability of legal serv-
ices to the poor. One commentator noted in 1969 that little modem litigation on this issue existed
at the appellate level. Because prosecuting an appeal is expensive, the impoverished evicted ten-
ant could not afford to initiate legal action. On the other hand, tenants who located a new resi-
dence probably did not deem it worth the trouble to proceed with any legal remedy. This
commentator, however, predicted that with the advent of the legal services program, such appel-
late sterility would be unlikely to continue. Note, Self-Help Eviction: Proposals for the Reform of
Eviction Procedures in New Jersey, 1 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 314, 328 n.58 (1969). The Spinks case was
initiated by Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, Inc.; the General Assembly's statutory response
to the decision was also at the behest of legal services. Interview with State Senator Joseph John-
son, conducted by Martin L. Holton, III, in Raleigh, N.C., Oct. 1, 1981.
6. Most existing landlord-tenant law developed from a legal basis created when society was
rural and agrarian. For an excellent discussion of how social changes in England and the United
States since the eighteenth century have made the presumptions of agrarian landlord-tenant law
inappropriate, see Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code 5-10, General Introduction (Ameri-
can Bar Found. Tent. Draft 1969).
7. 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 3.15 (1956).
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a criminal offense.8 Currently, almost all jurisdictions in the United States,9
including North Carolina,' 0 continue to adhere to the policy of designating
forcible entry as a criminal offense.
A landlord's potential criminal liability for forcible entry generally does
not provide a civil remedy for the tenant."1 A minority of American jurisdic-
tions hold that a landlord may use reasonable force to evict a wrongful tenant
without incurring civil liability.12 A sizeable number of states deem judicial
proceedings in summary ejectment to be the landlord's sole remedy; self-help,
either forcible or peaceful, renders available to the tenant a civil remedy. 13
Courts in a majority of jursidictions,14 however, hold that a landlord may re-
sort to self-help measures without civil liability provided the means employed
are peaceful. I5
8. 5 Rich. 2, 1 stat., ch. 8 (1381). The rationale for Parliamentary action appears to be
preservation of the peace and not protection of either landlord or tenant rights. Jordan v. Talbot,
55 Cal. 2d 597, 603 n.2, 361 P.2d 20, 23 n.2, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491 n.2 (1961).
9. Comment, Defects in the Current Forcible Entry and Detainer Laws of the United States
and England, 25 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1067, 1076 n.44 (1978).
10. No one shall make entry into any lands and tenements, or term for years, but in
cases where entry is given by law; and in such case, not with strong hand nor with multi-
tude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner, and if any man do the contrary,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-126 (1981). This language is essentially identical to the 1381 English statute.
11. Several isolated cases awarded the tenant damages for a landlord's use of force, see, e.g.,
Newton v. Harland, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (1840); Hillary v. Gay, 172 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1833); but the
law of England until 1965 held no civil cause of action maintainable. See, e.g., Hemmings v.
Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920] 1 K.B. 720 (expressly overruling Newlon); Pollen v. Brewer,
141 Eng. Rep. 860 (1859); Turner v. Maymott, 130 Eng. Rep. 64 (1823); Taunton v. Costar, 101
Eng. Rep. 1060 (1797). The Hemmings court reasoned that a criminal prohibition against a forci-
ble entry hardly justifies making a civil award to a wrongdoer whose wrongdoing provoked the
entry. Moreover, if a landlord cannot forcibly effect an eviction without being liable in damages
to the wrongful tenant, it must follow that the law confers a civil right of occupancy on the tenant
"the length of which is determined only by the law's delay." [1920] 1 K.B. at 737. See generally
Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida,
19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 238, 278-79 (1966).
The Rent Act, 1965, ch. 75, pt. III, however, makes landlord self-help in any form a criminal
offense. A landlord with a right of possession must instead obtain a court order and await restora-
tion of the premises by the bailiff. Note, supra note 5, at 317-18.
12. See, e.g., Howe v. Firth, 43 Colo. 75, 95 P. 603 (1908); Gower v. Waters, 125 Me. 223, 132
A. 550 (1926); Stone v. Lahey, 133 Mass. 426 (1882); Paddock v. Clay, 138 Mont. 541, 357 P.2d 1
(1960); Whitney v. Sweet, 22 N.H. 10 (1850); Virginia Iron, Coal'& Coke Co. v. Dickenson, 143
Va. 250, 129 S.E. 543 (1925); cf. Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 65 Wyo. 367, 202 P.2d 663 (1949)
(standard of landlord responsibility in connection with tenant's goods remaining on premises is
reasonable conduct under the circumstances).
13. Prior to 1981, as a result of Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E. 529 (1890), North
Carolina was identified by one commentator as belonging to this group of states. Annot., 6
A.L.R.3d 177, 186-87 (1966). For the MAosseller facts, see text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
For other states in this group, see, e.g., Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1961); Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d 711 (Del. 1972); Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781
(D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Weber v. McMillan, 285 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1973); Berg v. Wiley, 264
N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978); Polley v. Shoemaker, 201 Neb. 91, 266 N.W.2d 222 (1978); Edwards v.
C.N. Inv. Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 83.59(3) (West 1976).
14. See generally 2 Restatement (Second) of Property, § 14.2 reporter's note 1 (1977). Other
commentators, also relying on Mosseller, placed North Carolina within this group ofjursidictions.
See Boyer & Grable, Reform of Landlord-Tenant Statutes to Eliminate Self-Help in Evicting
Tenants, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 800, 801 n.4 (1968). But see Annot., supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Krasner v. Gurley, 252 Ala. 235, 40 So. 2d 328 (1949); Mason v. Hawkes, 52
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In Spinks v. Taylor the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the le-
gality of peaceful self-help in North Carolina. In Spinks the landlord pad-
locked plaintiffs apartment because of her failure to pay rent. 16 Since resort
to judicial process was severely limited,17 padlocking was the standard operat-
ing procedure for dealing with tenants in arrears on their rent. Up until
Spinks' suit, the procedure had proven successful,18 with beneficial results for
Conn. 12 (1884); Perry v. Evanston YMCA, 92 Ill. App. 3d 820, 416 N.E.2d 340 (1981); Calef v.
Jesswein, 176 N.E. 632 (Ind. App. 1931); Whitney v. Brown, 75 Kan. 678, 90 P. 277 (1907); Stoll
Oil Ref. Co. v. Pierce, 337 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960); Pine Hill Assocs. v. Malveaux, 93 Misc. 2d 63,
403 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Term 1978); Simhiser v. Farber, 270 Wis. 420, 71 N.W.2d 412 (1955).
In jurisdictions that permit a landlord to resort to peaceful self-help without incurring civil
liability, difficulty arises in defining which acts constitute force and which are merely "peaceful."
In arriving at a definition for civil causes of action, courts may refer to the meaning of force as
interpreted in relation to the criminal forcible entry and detainer statutes. See generally Note,
Landlord-Tenant Law: Abolition of Self-Help in Minnesota, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 723, 727 n.26
(1979). Defendants in Spinks took this tack in proclaiming padlocking to be peaceful in reliance
on State v. Leary, 136 N.C. 578, 48 S.E. 570 (1904), in which the landlord's lockout of tenant did
not subject him to criminal liability under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-126. See Brief for Appellee at 26-
27, Spfinks.
Actions short of actual violence may be deemed forcible. See, e.g., Karp v. Margolis, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958) (entry with help of locksmith; commercial tenants); McNeil v.
Higgins, 86 Cal. App. 2d 723, 195 P.2d 470 (1948) (entry through an open window in tenant's
absence); Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937) (procurement of keys and entry
by landlord in tenant's absence); Walls v. Endel, 17 Fla. 478 (1880) (duress by frequent visits to
emphasize hopelessness of tenant's situation); Ardell v. Milner, 166 So. 2d 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964) (changing locks); Schwartz v. McQuaid, 214 Ill. 357, 73 N.E. 582 (1905) (removing obstruc-
tion over opening in building); Pelavin v. Misner, 241 Mich. 209, 217 N.W. 36 (1928) (false pre-
tenses; threat of force); Crossen v. Campbell, 102 Or. 666, 202 P. 745 (1921) (threats of force);
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100 (1944) (entrance with passkey and removal of
door after entry); Simhiser v. Farber, 270 Wis. 420, 71 N.W.2d 412 (1955) (ruse or stratagem).
16. The lease entered into between the landlord and the plaintiff-tenant specifically provided
for termination on default of rent and gave the landlord a right of reentry. Spinks v. Taylor, 303
N.C. at 258, 278 S.E.2d at 502. At common law a lease provision to this effect was essential and
absent such an agreement, a tenancy was not terminated by the tenant's failure to pay rent. North
Carolina has modified the common-law rule by conferring on the landlord the right to immediate
possession whenever the tenant defaults in payment of rent subsequent to a ten-day demand.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-3 (1976).
17. In 1974, due to the burdensome number of summary eviction actions, personnel of the
office of the clerk of superior court imposed a rule limiting the number of complaints in summary
ejectment filed by any one landlord to ten per day and also limited the total number of complaints
in summary ejectment that would be calendared on any given day to twenty-five. Affidavit of Ann
Hackney, Deputy Clerk of Superior Court, Guilford County, Addendum to Record, at 2-4,
Spinks.
By 1976, out of defendant's 825 apartments, approximately 400 units were in default seven
days after rent was due. Because of the rule imposed in 1974, defendant was without adequate
means to evict tenants defaulting during the month; he subsequently resorted to the padlocking
procedure. Affidavit of John R. Taylor, Jr., Record at 45-46.
18. Empirical evidence from the period April 1977 to March 1978 revealed that the padlock-
ing procedure accomplished the business purpose of prompting tenants to cure defaults. The aver-
age monthly number of defaults was 426 ($60,000-80,000 in rents). By padlocking day, the last
Tuesday of the month, an average of -374 tenants had cured their delinquency, leaving 52 apart-
ments to be padlocked. By the time the resident manager went to carry out the procedure, an
average of six tenants had vacated. Of the remaining 46, an average of 36 paid their rent in full
with an average of 9 more paying within 48 hours. This left an average of one tenant to be
evicted.
In the pre-padlocking era, when summary ejectment procedures had been utilized, 600 ten-
ants were evicted by the courts in 1974, and 650 in 1975. In contrast, during the interval when the
F adlocking procedure was used, 50 tenants were evicted in 1976, 75 in 1977, and 125 in 1978
figures for e latter two years apparently include apartments acquired after 1976 as to which the
self-help procedures were never used). Affidavit of John R. Taylor, Jr., Record at 49-50.
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both the tenants and the landlord. 19
In accordance with the landlord's procedure, 20 Spinks received warning
that unless payment were made the apartment would be padlocked. Spinks
failed to pay the rent, and her apartment was padlocked. Thereafter, Spinks
filed a verified complaint alleging that the resident manager denied her access
to the locked premises to retrieve certain items of clothing. Such refusal was
in direct contradiction to the landlord's eviction procedure. 2 1 Plaintiff claimed
damages for trespass to real and personal property, for breach of the covenant
of quiet enjoyment, for conversion of personal property and for violation of
the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.22 Both plaintiff-tenant and de-
fendant-landlord stipulated plaintiff's failure to pay rent and moved for sum-
mary judgment. The trial court granted defendant's motion.23
The North Carolina Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the trial
court action and held that self-help is lawful when the means employed are
peaceful.24 The appeals court noted that self-help remedies are consistent
with the modem policy of diverting conflicts away from the courts.25 The
appeals court relied heavily on the late nineteenth century case of Mosseller v.
19. Defendant-landlord alleged that because of the delays inherent in summary ejectment
generally, coupled with those inherent in limitations imposed by the rules established in 1974 by
court personnel, tenants ended up at least two months in arrears. These tenants were rarely, if
ever, financially able to pay rent for two or more months. Defendant was also financially unable
to risk allowing tenants two months behind to remain in possession upon a tenant's promise to pay
promptly in the future. After initiation of self-help, however, tenants were more likely to make
their accounts current. Less turnover resulted, and as defendant-landlord alleged, both he and the
tenants appeared to appreciate the stability in the residential population. Id. at 51.
20. Defendant-landlord described the procedure established by his attorney and carried out
by his resident managers as follows: Rent throughout the complex was due on the first of every
month. Eight days later, the apartment manager issued notices to delinquent tenants-unless rent
was received before the last Tuesday of the month, the apartment would be padlocked. On the
day scheduled forpadlocking, the apartment manager would go and knock loudly announcing the
purpose of the visit. If the tenant paid the rent, or if the tenant protested, the manager ceased the
padlocking procedure and informed the tenant that court proceedings would be initiated. If the
tenant was absent, the manager first checked the apartment to insure no children or pets were
present and then padlocked the door. Notice of padlocking was posted and the manager at-
tempted to notify the tenant personally. If the tenant requested personal property, he was permit-
ted to enter and remove it. Again, if at any time the tenant objected to the padlocking, the self-
help procedure ceased and resort was to be made to the courts. 303 N.C. at 263, 278 S.E.2d at 505.
21. See id. at 263-64, 278 S.E.2d at 505-06.
22. The supreme court denied the applicability of the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 to -56 (1981). "We cannot say that defendant's padlocking proce-
dures offend 'established public policy' or constitute a practice which is 'immoral, unethical, op-
pressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers."' 303 N.C. at 265, 278 S.E.2d at
506.
23. 303 N.C. at 259-60, 278 S.E.2d at 503.
24. Spinks v. Taylor, 47 N.C. App. 68, 266 S.E.2d 857 (1980), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 303
N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981).
25. In addition, the modem policy of diverting conflicts away from the courts supports
lawful self-help remedies. This theory, utilizing arbitration, "citizen courts," . . . and
other non-court methods of resolving disputes, recognizes that the courts cannot resolve
every dispute between persons and the state. Proper and peaceful self-help remedies by
landlords have a place in this scheme.
Id. at 76, 266 S.E.2d at 861.
The court went on to note that
[hiere, plaintiffs do not deny that they were delinquent in their rent payments and that
defendant was entitled to possession of the premises. They only insist defendant could
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Deaver26 in rendering its decision. In Mosseller the landlord entered the ten-
ant's house while the tenant was present "under such circumstances as to con-
stitute a forcible entry under the [forcible entry and detainer] statute." 27 The
trial judge instructed the jury that the landlord "had the right to go there and
put him out by force, if no more force was used than was necessary for that
purpose."'28 The North Carolina Supreme Court held the instruction incorrect
because public policy "required the owner to use peaceful means or resort to
the courts in order to regain his possession." 29
In Spinks the North Carolina Supreme Court approved the appeals
court's determination of North Carolina law.30 It refused, however, to permit
any overreaching by the landlord, noting the contradiction between the pro-
posed padlocking procedure and its actual implementation with respect to
Spinks.31 The court implicitly recognized and addressed the potential for vio-
lence by narrowly defining what constituted "peaceful" self-help measures.
While a landlord was permitted to use peaceful means such as padlocking to
reenter and take possession of leased premises subject to forfeiture, he could
not do so against the tenant's will; an objection by the tenant elevated the
landlord's reentry to a forcible one. At that time, the landlord's sole lawful
recourse was formal judicial proceedings.32 Based on this narrow holding the
supreme court reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment on behalf
of defendant-landlord. 33
The supreme court's narrow definition of peaceful self-help, which en-
hanced tenant security, followed the efforts of the General Assembly to im-
prove the procedures by which residential tenants could protect their rights.
In 1977 the legislature substantially changed North Carolina's residential land-
lord-tenant law by enacting two new articles in chapter 42 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes-article 5, Residential Rental Agreements, 34 and article
6, Tenant Security Deposit Act.35 The more significant of these changes, arti-
not use peaceful self-help to regain possession of the premises and that he must resort to
the courts for this purpose. Under the facts of this case, we reject plaintiffs argument.
Id.
26. 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E. 529 (1890).
27. Id. at 495, 11 S.E. at 530.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. "It seems clear to us, then, that this state recognizes the right of a lessor to enter peace-
fully and repossess leased premises which are subject to forfeiture due to nonpayment of rent."
303 N.C. at 262, 278 S.E.2d at 504.
31. Id. at 264, 278 S.E.2d at 506. The supreme court noted that plaintiff Spinks' allegation
that she requested access to her apartment to retrieve clothing contradicted defendant's assertion
that an ousted tenant requesting entrance to the apartment to obtain personal property would be
allowed to enter. Id.
32. Id. at 263, 278 S.E.2d at 505.
33. Id. at 266, 278 S.E.2d at 506. "A refusal by the landlord to permit a tenant to enter the
premises, for whatever purposes, would elevate the taking to a forceful taking and subject the
landlord to damages." Id. at 254, 278 S.E.2d at 506.
34. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 790, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1006 (codified as amended
at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-38 to -44 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
35. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 914, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1237 (codified as amended at
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-50 to -56 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
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cle 5, made it the legal duty of a residential landlord to provide a fit and
habitable dwelling.36 Subsequently, in 1979 the General Assembly declared
that retaliatory eviction is an affirmative defense in summary ejectment ac-
tions because it is public policy "to protect tenants. . . who seek to exercise
their rights to decent, safe, and sanitary housing. ' 37 In 1979 North Carolina
legislators also created a new procedure for staying execution in summary
ejectment actions.38
In 1981 the General Assembly enacted "An Act to Clarify Landlord Evic-
tion Remedies in Residential Tenancies."'39 This Act abolished self-help evic-
tions in residential tenancies and continues the evolutionary process toward
greater tenant rights. The new law not only mandates judicial proceedings in
every eviction situation, it also outlaws any lease or contract provision to the
contrary as "void against public policy."'40 The North Carolina General As-
sembly expressly premised the new law on the public policy of maintaining the
public peace.41 Few things are more important to a person than his or her
home; nothing short of a criminal act is more likely to provoke violence, anger
and breaches of the peace than locking a person or family out of their home.42
The mandatory requirement that a landlord use a judicial proceeding for
eviction of residential tenants also promotes the public policy of guaranteeing
to all citizens a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. The tenant re-
ceives notice and is ordinarily allowed to present his side at a hearing.43
36. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-42 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
37. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 807, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 960 (codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 42-37.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
38. Law of June 7, 1979, ch. 820, §§ 1-6, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 1032 (codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-34 (b)-(g) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
39. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, [1981] 6 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 238 (to be codified at N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 42-25.1 to -25.4, 44A-2). See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
40. Id. § 1 (to be codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.3). When landlord self-help is outlawed
by case law rather than by statute, this aspect is usually not directly addressed. Although assert-
able by implication, without direct prohibition of reentry clauses, problems can arise. For exam-
ple, one Minnesota commentator noted that although the Minnesota Supreme Court implicitly
invalidated reentry clauses
reentry clauses may continue to be written into leases. If a tenant is unaware that a
reentry clause included in his lease is un-enforceable, the clause may either deter him
from challenging a self-help eviction by the landlord, or cause him to move if the land-
lord threatens a self-help eviction. Hence, to ensure that the effectiveness of the Berg
rule [Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978)] is not diminished by any in lerrorem
effects of reentry clauses, the court or the legislature should specifically prohibit the in-
clusion of such clauses in leases.
Note, supra note 15, at 733.
41. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, § 1, [1981] 6 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 238 (to be codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25.1).
42. Amicus Curiae Brief (State of North Carolina) at 10, Sinks. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has also pointed out that "to approve [a] lockout. . . merely because in [the plaintif's]
absence no actual violence erupted when locks were being changed, would be to encourage all
future tenants, in order to protect their possessions, to be vigilant and thereby set the stage for
[every] kind of public disturbance." Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Minn. 1978).
43. One can question whether summary ejectment proceedings provide a meaningful oppor-
tunity for the tenant's presentation of a defense. Because the proceedings are summary, the range
of issues litigated is limited. Legal title or ultimate right to possession will not be considered by
the court. The landlord and tenant deal or compete on different levels. The landlord is generally
a professional with knowledge of business and the resources to use the legal process for his own
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An additional reason for requiring judicial process is that the need for
housing, and any hardship resulting from its denial, are probably issues too
vital to be adjusted outside the orderly process of law.
Although the 1981 Act seemingly continues the evolutionary process to-
ward ensuring greater tenant rights, its effectiveness may be limited. This Act
appears to be inapplicable when the residential tenant has already abandoned
the premises. 44 Furthermore, the Act limits the tenant's recovery to actual
damages and specifically excludes punitive damages, treble damages and dam-
ages for emotional distress.45 In most instances of peaceful self-help, actual
damages will be minimal. A tenant will probably view litigation as inappro-
priate because of the time and expense involved. The law's effectiveness is
also undermined by its failure to provide any criminal sanctions against self-
help.46 Nonetheless the new law conceivably may lead to peaceful self-help
action being deemed offensive to the state's forcible entry and detainer statute.
The 1981 Act is applicable only to residential tenancies. 47 Thus, the
Spinks rule that peaceful self-help may be used continues as good law for
commercial tenancies. In commercial situations, the potential for violence is
less. Loss of one's home is more personally and psychologically threatening
than loss of possession of commercial premises, and the need for immediate
replacement of commercial space is less vital in terms of immediate survival
needs. Moreover, in a business situation the parties are generally dealing at
arms length; the potential for landlord overreaching is not as great.
In a practical sense, however, resort to the legal process in a commercial
purposes; the tenant is an amateur operating in a system that is alien if not hostile to him. The
various summary ejectment statutes that provide a simple, inexpensive and expeditious procedure
are pro-landlord statutes. See Haemmel, The North Carolina Small Claims Court-An Empirical
Study, 9 Wake Forest L. Rev. 503, 508 (1973); Whitman, Defending the Low-Income Tenant in
North Carolina, 2 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1970).
44. See Martinez v. Steinbaum, - Colo. -, 623 P.2d 49 (1981); Bunel of New Orleans, Inc.
v. Cigali, 348 So. 2d 993 (La. App.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1977); Berg v. Wiley, 264
N.W.2d 145 (Minn. 1978).
At least one statutory scheme for the abolition of landlord self-help makes abandonment an
express exception; in Florida, resort to judicial process is unnecessary
[w]hen the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit. In the absence of actual knowledge
of abandonment, it shall be presumed that the tenant has abandoned the dwelling unit if
he is absent from the premises for a period of time equal to one half the time for periodic
rental payments. However, this presumption shall not apply if rent is current or tenant
has notified the landlord of his intended absence.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 83.59 (West 1976).
45. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, § 1, [19811 6 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 238 (to be codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.4).
46. Subsequent to judicial abolition of landlord self-help, at least one state has expressly
made use of self-help a criminal offense:
A landlord, agent of the landlord or person acting under the landlord's direction or con-
trol who unlawfully and intentionally removes or excludes a tenant from lands or tene-
ments or intentionally interrupts or causes the interruption of electricity, heat, gas, or
water services to the tenant with the intent to unlawfully remove or exclude the tenant
from lands or tenements is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 504.25 (West Supp. 1981).
47. Law of June 12, 1981, ch. 566, § 1, [1981] 6 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 238 (to be codified at
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.1).
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situation will probably always be the end result. The commercial tenant is
more aware of his legal rights, and more likely to raise an objection to the self-
help eviction. In accordance with the Spinks rule, any objection necessitates
judicial action. However, since the Spinks decision did not expressly address
the ability of the landlord and tenant to contract for self-help eviction even in
the face of tenant objections, commercial landlords may still attempt to incor-
porate such contractual remedies in their lease agreements. However, tenants
who lease premises for both commercial and residential purposes will proba-
bly be protected by the 1981 Act prohibiting self-help.48
Although the 1981 Act promotes tenants' rights, it imposes a substantial
burden on the courts in terms of the volume of ejectment proceedings. In
urban North Carolina areas, summary ejectment proceedings constitute the
bulk of actions in small claims court.49 Tactics by the local trial court in an
effort to limit the number of actions per landlord apparently drove Spinks'
landlord to establish a self-help procedure. 50
When the statutory eviction remedy is limited or takes an unreasonable
length of time, a landlord is unable to collect the rent due. Loss of profits and
possible inability to meet the landlord's own credit obligations ensue. If un-
able to sustain a minimal level of profit, the landlord may be compelled either
to withdraw housing units from the marketplace or to rent only to tenants
certain not to fall delinquent.5 1 These alternatives could have drastic effects
on the availability of housing for poorer tenants-the very tenants sought to
be protected by the statute.
Because of the limitations of the 1981 Act the State must now look for
alternative solutions that will satisfy the judicial process requirement but will
not over-burden the court system. The use of citizen and housing courts to
divert landlord-tenant conflicts away from the formal legal system may be one
such creative alternative.52
KATHLEEN PEPI SOUTHERN
48. Accord, Zankman v. Tireno Towers, 121 N.J. Super. 346, 297 A.2d 23 (1972) (tenant
deemed to occupy his apartment solely as a resident within meaning of unlawful entry and dis-
traint statute although he executed lease in his own name and also in name of his company and
made some incidental use of apartment in his capacity as a salesman).
49. See Haemmel, supra note 43, at 505. For an excellent empirical examination of landlord-
tenant justice in small claims courts, see J. Ruhnlea, Housing Justice in Small Claims Courts
(1979).
50. See note 21 supra.
51. See Note, supra note 5, at 331.
52. See R. Scott, Specialized Courts: Housing Justice in the United States (1981).
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